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In one-out-of-m spacetime-constrained oblivious transfer (SCOT), Alice and Bob agree on m
pairwise spacelike separated output spacetime regions R0, R1, . . . , Rm−1 in an agreed reference frame
in a spacetime that is Minkowski, or close to Minkowski; Alice inputs a message xi in the causal
past of a spacetime point Qi of Ri, for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m− 1}; Bob inputs b ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m− 1} in the
intersection of the causal pasts of Q0, Q1, . . . , Qm−1 and outputs xb in Rb; Alice remains oblivious to
b anywhere in spacetime; and Bob is unable to obtain xi in Ri and xj in Rj for any pair of different
numbers i, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , m−1}. We introduce unconditionally secure one-out-of-m SCOT protocols
extending the one-out-of-two SCOT protocols of Refs. [1, 2], for arbitrary integers m ≥ 2. We define
the task of one-out-of-m distributed quantum access with classical memory (DQACM), which works
as a subroutine to implement a class PCC of one-out-of-m SCOT protocols where distant agents
only need to communicate classically. We present unconditionally secure one-out-of-m DQACM
protocols and one-out-of-m SCOT protocols of the class PCC, for arbitrary integers m ≥ 2. We
discuss various generalizations of SCOT. In particular, we introduce a straightforward extension of
SCOT to a k-out-of-m setting, and suggest protocols where distant agents only need to communicate
classically, while we leave the investigation of their security as an open problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
One-out-of-m oblivious transfer is a fundamental cryp-
tographic task that works as a primitive in secure compu-
tation [3]. Secure computation [4] is an area of cryptog-
raphy in which two or more mistrustful parties compute
a joint function of their private inputs in such a way that
there is no information about their inputs, which does not
follow from the output of the computation, revealed to
the other parties. In an one-out-of-m oblivious transfer
protocol, Alice inputs m ≥ 2 messages x0,x1, . . . ,xm−1,
Bob inputs a number b ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m− 1}, and Bob out-
puts the message xb. An one-out-of-m oblivious trans-
fer protocol must satisfy two security conditions: 1) the
condition of security for honest Alice, also denoted as se-
curity against dishonest Bob, according to which if Alice
follows the protocol honestly but Bob does not, Bob can-
not obtain more than one of Alice’s messages; and 2) the
condition of security for honest Bob, also denoted as se-
curity against dishonest Alice, according to which if Bob
follows the protocol honestly but Alice does not, Alice
remains oblivious to Bob’s input b.
Protocols for one-out-of-m oblivious transfer and more
general secure computations have been proposed, with
the security being based in computational or technolog-
ical assumptions, for example, the assumed difficulty of
finding the prime factors of large integers [3, 5], or the as-
sumption that quantum memories are bounded or noisy
[6]. However, one-out-of-m oblivious transfer and more
general secure computations cannot be implemented with
unconditional security in the standard setting of non-
relativistic quantum cryptography [7–9], i.e. it is impos-
sible to guarantee their security only from the laws of
∗ D.Pitalua-Garcia@damtp.cam.ac.uk
quantum physics. In particular, Lo’s no-go theorem [7]
states that if a protocol for one-out-of-m oblivious trans-
fer is unconditionally secure against dishonest Alice then,
with sufficiently advanced quantum technology, Bob can
obtain all messages x0,x1, . . . ,xm−1.
One-out-of-m oblivious transfer and more general se-
cure computations cannot achieve unconditional security
even in the more general setting of relativistic quan-
tum cryptography, introduced by Kent [10, 11], in which
each party in the protocol has trusted agents performing
quantum computations and communications at different
spacetime points, some of which are spacelike separated.
For example, in the case of one-out-of-m oblivious trans-
fer, if a quantum relativistic protocol taking place in a
finite region R of spacetime, in some reference frame F , is
unconditionally secure against Alice, then it follows from
Lo’s no-go theorem that Bob can perform the protocol
honestly with an input b = 0 and obtain x0 in R and then
apply a unitary operation U on his global quantum sys-
tem, which is spread among various locations, and com-
plete it within the spacetime region T consisting in the in-
tersection of the causal futures of all the spacetime points
of R – for example, Bob can simply send all his quantum
systems to a common spacetime point within T and then
apply U there – and then apply a quantum measurement
to obtain x1 and then proceed similarly to obtain x2 and
so on. This is in contrast to other tasks in mistrustful
cryptography, like coin tossing and bit commitment, for
which unconditionally secure protocols cannot exist in
non-relativistic quantum cryptography [12–14], but for
which there are unconditionally secure protocols in rela-
tivistic quantum cryptography [10, 15–19].
Nevertheless, two relativistic variations of one-out-of-
two oblivious transfer have been recently proposed, de-
noted as location-oblivious data transfer (LODT) [20]
and spacetime-constrained oblivious transfer (SCOT) [1],
2which have been shown to achieve unconditional security
[1, 20]. In LODT, Alice transfers a message to Bob at
a random location in spacetime that neither Alice nor
Bob can determine in advance, and Alice remains obliv-
ious to the location where Bob received the message. In
SCOT, according to a bit b input by Bob, Bob either
obtains a message x0 of Alice in a spacetime region R0
or a message x1 of Alice in a spacetime region R1, where
R0 and R1 are spacelike separated, and where Alice re-
mains oblivious to Bob’s input b. Interestingly, LODT
and SCOT are the only known cryptographic tasks that
necessitate both the no-superluminal principle of relativ-
ity theory and the properties of quantum information to
achieve unconditional security [1, 20], in contrast to coin
tossing and bit commitment, for example, for which there
are unconditionally secure relativistic protocols that are
purely classical [10, 15, 16, 19].
Two unconditionally secure protocols for SCOT have
been presented in the academic literature [1, 2]. The
protocol of Ref. [1] requires the preparation of random
Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) [21] states and their se-
cure transmission to distant laboratories. The protocol
of Ref. [2] requires the preparation and transmission of
quantum states between adjacent laboratories, and the
transmission of classical information to distant labora-
tories. Here, we introduce unconditionally secure pro-
tocols that generalize those of Refs. [1, 2] to the one-
out-of-m setting, in which Alice inputs m ≥ 2 messages
x0,x1, . . . ,xm−1, there are m ≥ 2 pairwise spacelike sep-
arated output spacetime regions R0, R1, . . . , Rm−1, Bob
inputs an integer b ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m − 1} and outputs xb
in Rb, Alice remains oblivious to b anywhere in space-
time, and Bob cannot output xi in Ri and also xj in
Rj for any pair of different numbers i, j from the set
{0, 1, . . . ,m− 1}.
Potential applications of one-out-of-m SCOT include
situations where Bob needs to access, at a specific loca-
tion and within a short interval of time, one of various
pieces of information input by Alice, and Bob requires his
choice of accessed piece of information to remain secret to
Alice. For example, potential applications of one-out-of-
m SCOT and generalizations are in high frequency trad-
ing strategies (HFT) in the stock market, where must
transaction are completed within half a millisecond [22].
Consider for example in this case the following situation.
Alice is a company that sells information about the stock
market in real time in a set of different possible locations
and Bob is a company that trades in the stock market
using HFT strategies. Alice offers Bob one piece of her
database x0,x1, . . . ,xm−1, each being information on the
stock market at the respective location L0,L1, . . . ,Lm−1
at real time. Each Li could be the location of a stock
market in some part of the world, for instance New York,
Toronto, Paris, London, Tokyo, etc. Bob pays Alice a
fixed amount of money to obtain an entry xb in the lo-
cation Lb in real time. Bob requires that his choice b re-
mains private from Alice, while Alice requires that Bob
cannot access her entry xi in Li at real time, for more
than one i from the set {0, 1, . . . ,m − 1}. One-out-of-m
SCOT guarantees with unconditional security that Alice
cannot learn Bob’s choice b anywhere in spacetime and
that within a time interval smaller than 0.5 ms, which is
relevant for HFT strategies, Bob cannot obtain xi in Li
and also xj in Lj for any pair of different numbers i, j
from the set {0, 1, . . . ,m−1} if the distance between any
pair of locations from the set L0,L1, . . . ,Lm−1 is at least
150 km, which is the maximum distance that light can
travel in 0.5 ms in the approximately Minkowski space-
time near the Earth surface.
We mainly focus on a class PCC of one-out-of-m SCOT
protocols extending those of Ref. [2], which require clas-
sical – but not quantum – communication among distant
locations, and we show them unconditionally secure. We
introduce a quantum-cryptography task denoted as one-
out-of-m distributed quantum access with classical mem-
ory (DQACM), which works as a fundamental primitive
to construct the class PCC of one-out-of-m SCOT proto-
cols.
Broadly speaking, a protocol for one-out-of-m
DQACM consists in the following steps. Alice encodes
m messages r0, r1, . . . , rm−1 chosen randomly from pre-
determined sets in a quantum state |Ψsr〉, where r =
(r0, r1, . . . , rm−1), and where s denotes a basis chosen
randomly by Alice from a predetermined set of non-
mutually orthogonal bases. Alice sends |Ψsr〉 to Bob. Bob
chooses a random number c ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m−1}, applies a
quantum measurement Mc on |Ψsr〉, and obtains a classi-
cal measurement outcome d. At a later time Alice gives
s to Bob, who then uses d and s to learn Alice’s in-
put rc. A one-out-of-m DQACM protocol must satisfy
a security condition against dishonest Bob, according to
which, if Alice follows the protocol honestly and Bob fol-
lows a cheating strategy in which he applies an arbitrary
quantum operation O on |Ψs
r
〉 that produces at least two
quantum systems B0 and B1, and then quantum mea-
surements M˜
s
0 and M˜
s
1 are applied on B0 and B1 after
receiving s, giving classical outcomes r′i and r
′
j , respec-
tively, then the probability that r′i equals ri and r
′
j equals
rj is negligible for Alice’s input messages of large size,
and for any pair of different numbers i, j from the set
{0, 1, . . . ,m− 1}.
We introduce a class C of one-out-of-m DQACM pro-
tocols. We show that by satisfying a few properties the
protocols of this class are unconditionally secure. We give
specific examples of unconditionally secure one-out-of-m
DQACM protocols from the class C.
We also briefly discuss various generalizations of one-
out-of-m SCOT. In particular, we suggest a definition
for k-out-of-m SCOT, for arbitrary natural numbers
k < m and m ≥ 2, according to which Alice and Bob
agree on m pairwise spacelike separated output space-
time regions R0, R1, . . . , Rm−1, Alice inputs m messages
x0,x1, . . . ,xm−1, Bob obtains Alice’s input xbl in the
output spacetime region Rbl , for k different numbers
bl ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m− 1} chosen by Bob, Bob cannot obtain
xi in Ri, for more than k different elements i from the
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inputs bl, anywhere in spacetime. We suggest protocols
for k-out-of-m SCOT where communication between dis-
tant locations is only classical, based on the primitive of
k-out-of-m DQACM, which is a natural generalization
of one-out-of-m DQACM into a k-out-of-m setting, but
we leave as an open question to investigate whether they
are unconditionally secure. In particular, we propose pro-
tocols for k-out-of-m DQACM extending the class C of
protocols for one-out-of-m DQACM, and we leave as an
open problem to show whether they are unconditionally
secure.
This paper is organized as follows. In section II, we de-
scribe the setting of relativistic quantum cryptography,
we provide some mathematical notation and we recall the
SCOT protocols of Refs. [1, 2]. We define one-out-of-m
SCOT in section III. In section IV, we introduce an un-
conditionally secure one-out-of-m SCOT protocol PQC
that extends the one-out-of-two SCOT protocol of Ref.
[1], and which requires quantum communication between
distant locations. We define the task of one-out-of-m
DQACM in section V. In section VI, we present a class
C of unconditionally secure protocols for one-out-of-m
DQACM, we show that this class of protocols are uncon-
ditionally secure from the satisfaction of a few properties,
and we give specific examples of this class of protocols.
In section VII, we introduce a class PCC of one-out-of-
m SCOT protocols where communication between dis-
tant locations is only classical, and where one-out-of-m
DQACM acts as a subroutine; we show the class PCC
is unconditionally secure if the one-out-of-m DQACM
subroutine is unconditionally secure; and we discuss spe-
cific examples of protocols from the class PCC where the
one-out-of-m DQACM subroutine belongs to the class
C. Section VIII discusses generalizations of one-out-of-m
SCOT; in particular, definitions of k-out-of-m SCOT and
k-out-of-m DQACM are suggested; protocols for k-out-
of-m DQACM and k-out-of-m SCOT are outlined, with
the investigation of their security being left as an open
problem. We conclude in section IX with a discussion
of our results and of possible connections with other re-
search problems in quantum information and relativistic
quantum cryptography.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Relativistic quantum cryptography
In relativistic quantum cryptography, security is guar-
anteed from 1) the no-superluminal principle of relativ-
ity theory, stating that physical systems and information
cannot travel faster than light, which is satisfied by quan-
tum theory; and 2) the properties of quantum informa-
tion, for example, the no-cloning theorem [23, 24], the
impossibility of perfectly distingushing non-orthogonal
quantum states, the monogamy of quantum entangle-
ment [25], the existence of quantum correlations that vi-
olate Bell inequalities [26], etc.
Relativistic-quantum cryptography is usually consid-
ered for spacetimes that are Minkowski, or close to
Minkowski, as near the Earth surface. But, relativis-
tic quantum cryptography can also apply to arbitrary
curved spacetimes with well defined causal structure, if
the parties participating in the cryptographic tasks have
a well description of the spacetime geometry, if they can-
not substantially alter the geometry of spacetime, and if
within the region of spacetime where the cryptographic
tasks take place, there are not wormholes or other mecha-
nisms allowing them to send signals faster than the speed
of light [10].
In the setting of relativistic quantum cryptography, the
parties participating in the cryptographic tasks, e.g. Al-
ice and Bob, consist of various agents who process and
communicate classical and quantum information at var-
ious locations in spacetime. In general, in a protocol for
relativistic quantum cryptography, the participating par-
ties must agree on spacetime regions where they should
communicate classical or quantum information to each
other. For this reason, the parties agree on a reference
frame F with global spacetime coordinates (t, x, y, z),
where the first entry is temporal and the others are spa-
tial, and where without loss of generality we use units
in which the speed of light is unity. In the case of mis-
trustful cryptography, which includes the task of SCOT
considered in this paper, Alice’s (Bob’s) agents work in
collaboration and trust each other, but Alice’s agents are
mistrustful of Bob’s agents and vice versa.
B. Notation
We define the sets Im = {0, 1, . . . ,m − 1} and [n] =
{1, 2, . . . , n} for any integer numbers m ≥ 2 and n ≥ 1.
For a string a of n entries, we denote the jth entry by aj ,
for j ∈ [n]. The Hamming distance between strings of
bits a and b is denoted by d(a,b). The Hamming weight
of a string of bits a is denoted by w(a). When applied to
bits (bit strings) ⊕ denotes (bitwise) sum modulo 2. We
denote the complement of a bit a by a¯ = a⊕ 1, and of a
bit aj by a¯j. The binary entropy of γ ∈ (0, 1) is given by
h(γ) ≡ −γ log2 γ − (1− γ) log2(1 − γ), and of γ ∈ {0, 1}
is defined as zero. We use the following notation for the
BB84 states: |ψ00〉 = |0〉, |ψ01〉 = |1〉, |ψ10〉 = |+〉, |ψ11〉 =
|−〉, where |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉). The computational and
Hadamard bases are denoted by {|0〉, |1〉} and {|+〉, |−〉},
respectively.
C. The SCOT protocols of Refs. [1, 2]
It is useful to recall the SCOT protocols of Refs. [1, 2],
because we will extend these in following sections. We
describe the common setting of these protocols before
presenting them.
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agents A, A0, and A1; and Bob has three agents B, B0,
and B1. Alice and Bob agree in a reference frame F and
in two spacelike separated output spacetime regions R0
and R1. Each of Alice’s (Bob’s) agents controls a secure
laboratory. It is useful to consider that the agents A and
B have adjacent laboratories, and that the agents Ai and
Bi have adjacent laboratories, for i ∈ {0, 1}. There is a
quantum channel between A and B. There is a classical
channel between Ai and Bi, for i ∈ {0, 1}.
In the SCOT protocol of Ref. [1], Alice’s agents share
secure and authenticated classical channels, and Bob’s
agents share secure and authenticated quantum channels.
On the other hand, in the SCOT protocol of Ref. [2],
Alice’s agents share secure and authenticated classical
channels, and Bob’s agents share secure and authenti-
cated classical channels, but Bob’s agents do not need to
share quantum channels; additionally, there is a classical
channel, as well as a quantum channel, between A and
B.
In both protocols, Alice and Bob agree on spacetime
points Q0 in R0 and Q1 in R1. We define G as the inter-
section of the causal pasts of Q0 and Q1. In the notation
of Refs. [1, 2], G is the causal past of a spacetime point
P , which is in the causal past of a spacetime point of R0
and a spacetime point of R1. Alice inputs a n−bit string
xi in the causal past of Qi, for i ∈ {0, 1}. Bob inputs a
bit b in G and outputs xb in Rb. An example of a setting
for the SCOT protocols of Refs. [1, 2] is given in Fig. 1.
As shown in Refs. [1, 2], both protocols are uncon-
ditionally secure. The protocols are trivially uncondi-
tionally secure against dishonest Alice, as Alice does not
receive any information from Bob. The protocols are un-
conditionally secure against dishonest Bob: in any cheat-
ing strategy by Bob allowed by quantum theory and rel-
ativity, the probability pn that Bob outputs x0 in R0
and x1 in R1 decreases exponentially with n, satisfying
pn ≤
(
1
2+
1
2
√
2
)n
. The protocols can be extended to allow
a small fraction of errors in Bob’s output message, while
still satisfying unconditional security for dishonest Bob.
1. The SCOT protocol of Ref. [1]
1. Agent A encodes a random n−bit string r in a
quantum state |ψsr〉 =
⊗
j∈[n]|ψs
j
rj
〉 of n BB84
states, where the n−bit string s is random and de-
notes the bases. A sends |ψsr〉 to B, who receives it
in G.
2. B obtains his input bit b in G and redirects the
received state |ψsr〉 to his colleague Bb, who receives
it in the causal past of at least one spacetime point
of Rb.
3. For i ∈ {0, 1}, A sends copies of s and r to her
colleague Ai, who receives them in the causal past
of Qi.
FIG. 1. Illustration of a setting for the SCOT protocols of
Refs. [1, 2] in a two-dimensional spacetime diagram, in a
frame F , of Minkowski spacetime. The world lines of the lab-
oratories of Alice’s agents A, A0, A1 (green rectangles), and
of the laboratories of Bob’s agents B, B0, B1 (yellow rectan-
gles) are indicated. The small dots represent the spacetime
points Q0 and Q1. The thin diagonal lines represent light
rays. The spacetime region G, consisting in the intersection
of the causal pasts of Q0 and Q1, is represented by the grey
shaded area. The spacetime regions Ri, where Bob’s agents
must obtain Alice’s inputs xi, correspond to the small red
rectangles, for i ∈ {0, 1}. We note that R0 and R1 are space-
like separated. Alice inputs a message xi in the causal past
of Qi, for i ∈ {0, 1}. Bob inputs a bit b in G and outputs xb
in Rb. The case b = 1 is illustrated.
4. For i ∈ {0, 1}, Ai obtains her input message xi ∈
{0, 1}n in the causal past of Qi.
5. For i ∈ {0, 1}, Ai gives s and ti = xi ⊕ r to Bi at
the spacetime point Qi.
6. Bb measures the quantum state |ψsr〉 in the basis
labeled by s and obtains the encoded string r in
Rb.
7. Bb computes the message xb = r⊕ tb and outputs
it in Rb.
2. The SCOT protocol of Ref. [2]
This SCOT protocol consists of two main stages. Stage
I includes quantum communication between agents A
and B, which can take place within their adjacent lab-
oratories, and which can take an arbitrarilly long time,
but which must be completed within G. For i ∈ {0, 1},
stage II includes fast classical processing and communica-
tion between the agents Ai and Bi, which again can take
place within their adjacent laboratories; it also includes
classical communication between the – possibly distant
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take place within G.
Stage I
1. For i ∈ {0, 1}, A generates random n−bit strings
r0, r1, s and sends copies to Ai, who receives them
in the causal past of Qi.
2. A prepares a system A = A1A2 · · ·An of n qubit-
pairs A1 = A10A
1
1, . . . , A
n = An0A
n
1 in the quantum
state |ψsr0,r1〉 =
⊗
j∈[n]
∣∣ψsj
r
j
0r
j
1
〉
A
j
0A
j
1
, where
∣∣ψsj
r
j
0r
j
1
〉
A
j
0A
j
1
=
∣∣ψ0
r
j
0
〉
A
j
sj
⊗∣∣ψ1
r
j
1
〉
A
j
s¯j
, (1)
for j ∈ [n]. We note that sj ∈ {0, 1} indicates which
qubit in the pair Aj is prepared in the computa-
tional basis (D0) and which one in the Hadamard
basis (D1). For i ∈ {0, 1}, the string ri is prepared
in the basis Di. A sends |ψsr0,r1〉, i.e. the qubits
A
j
i with their labels i, j, to B, for i ∈ {0, 1} and
j ∈ [n].
3. B chooses a random bit c, before receiving the
qubits from A. B measures Aji in the basis Dc,
obtaining the bit outcome dji , for i ∈ {0, 1} and
j ∈ [n]. The outcomes define di = (d1i , d2i , . . . , dni ),
for i ∈ {0, 1}. For i ∈ {0, 1}, B transmits c, d0 and
d1 to Bi, who receives these in the causal past of
Qi.
Stage II
4. B obtains his input b ∈ {0, 1} and gives the bit
b′ = c⊕ b to A.
5. For i ∈ {0, 1}, B transmits b to Bi, with the trans-
mission being completed in the causal past of Qi.
6. For i ∈ {0, 1}, A transmits b′ to Ai, with the trans-
mission being completed in the causal past of Qi.
7. For i ∈ {0, 1}, Ai obtains xi in the causal past of
Qi, and transfers ti = ri⊕b′ ⊕ xi and s to Bi at Qi.
8. Within Rb, Bb uses s, d0, d1 and c to compute
(d1s1⊕c, . . . , d
n
sn⊕c), which equals rc. Then, within
Rb, Bb outputs x′b = rc ⊕ tb, which equals xb.
D. Generalizing the SCOT protocols of Refs. [1, 2]
to the one-out-of-m setting
As described above, the SCOT protocols of Refs. [1, 2]
consider the one-out-of-two setting in which Alice has two
input messages x0 and x1 and there are two spacelike
separated output spacetime regions R0 and R1. In sec-
tion III we generalize the definition of SCOT to the one-
out-of-m setting, where Alice has m ≥ 2 input messages
x0,x1, . . . ,xm−1, there are m pair-wise spacelike sepa-
rated output spacetime regions R0, R1, . . . , Rm−1, Bob
should obtain xb in Rb for his chosen b ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m−1},
Alice should not learn b, and Bob should not get xi in
Ri for more than one i from the set {0, 1, . . . ,m− 1}.
As discussed above, in the SCOT protocol of Ref. [1],
Alice encodes a message r in a quantum state |ψs
r
〉, which
further encodes the messages x0 and x1. In this protocol,
Bob transmits the state |ψs
r
〉 received from Alice to his
agent Bb having access to Rb, who is then able to decode
r, after receiving the basis label s, and then uses r and
r⊕xb to decode xb in Rb. As we detail in section IV, this
protocol can be straightforwardly generalized to the one-
out-of-m setting because the message r of the quantum
state |ψsr〉 can be used to encode the messages xi with
the messages xi ⊕ r, for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m− 1}.
On the other hand, generalizing the SCOT protocol
of Ref. [2] to the one-out-of-m setting is more com-
plicated and interesting. We note from the discussion
above, that the SCOT protocol of Ref. [2] works in two
stages. Broadly, in the first stage, two messages r0 and
r1 are encoded in a quantum state |ψsr0,r1〉; and, in the
second stage, these messages are used to encode further
messages x0 and x1. Generalizing the first stage of this
protocol to the one-out-of-m setting requires to find a
set of quantum states |ψs
r0,r1,...,rm−1
〉 that encodesmmes-
sages r0, r1, . . . , rm−1, while satisfying some security con-
ditions. We have identified this stage with a task that we
denote as one-out-of-m distributed quantum access with
classical memory, which we describe in section V, with
a specific class of secure protocols for this task given in
section VI. Generalizing the second stage of the proto-
col to the one-out-of-m setting is straightforward, and is
done explicitly in section VII.
Finally, further generalizations are discussed in section
VIII. For example, we consider the case that the number
M ≥ 2 of output spacetime regions can be different to the
number m ≥ 2 of Alice’s inputs, and we discuss protocols
for k-out-of-m SCOT.
III. ONE-OUT-OF-m
SPACETIME-CONSTRAINED OBLIVIOUS
TRANSFER
We introduce a generalization of the definition of
SCOT of Ref. [1] to a one-out-of-m setting, for any
integer m ≥ 2. Alice (Bob) has trusted agents who
can process and communicate classical or quantum in-
formation at various locations in spacetime. But, Al-
ice’s agents do not trust Bob’s agents, and vice versa.
We assume that spacetime is Minkowski, or very close
to Minkowski, as near the Earth’s surface. Alice and
Bob agree on a reference frame F in spacetime, and on
m pairwise spacelike separated output spacetime regions
R0, R1, . . . , Rm−1; they also agree on a spacetime point
Qi of Ri, for i ∈ Im = {0, 1, . . . ,m−1}. For i ∈ Im, Alice
inputs a message xi in the causal past of Qi, chosen from
6FIG. 2. Illustration of a setting for one-out-of-m SCOT
in a two-dimensional spacetime diagram, in a frame F , of
Minkowski spacetime. The world lines of the laboratories of
Alice’s agents A0,A1, . . . ,Am−1 (green rectangles), and of the
laboratories of Bob’s agents B0,B1, . . . ,Bm−1 (yellow rectan-
gles) are indicated. The small dots represent the spacetime
points Q0, Q1, . . . , Qm−1. The thin diagonal lines represent
light rays. The spacetime region G, consisting in the intersec-
tion of the causal pasts of Q0, Q1, . . . , Qm−1, is represented
by the grey shaded area. The spacetime regions Ri, where
Bob’s agents must obtain Alice’s inputs xi, correspond to
the small red rectangles, for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m − 1}. We note
that R0, R1, . . . , Rm−1 are pairwise spacelike separated. Al-
ice inputs a message xi in the causal past of Qi, for i ∈
{0, 1, . . . ,m− 1}. Bob inputs a number b ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m− 1}
in G and outputs xb in Rb. The case b = 0 is illustrated.
a set of possible messages previously agreed with Bob.
Bob inputs a number b ∈ Im in the spacetime region G,
which is defined as the intersection of the causal pasts
of the spacetime points Q0, Q1, . . . , Qm−1, and he out-
puts xb in Rb. We illustrate an example of a setting for
one-out-of-m SCOT in Fig. 2.
A one-out-of-m SCOT protocol must satisfy correct-
ness and security properties. Broadly speaking, the cor-
rectness property states that Bob obtains xb in Rb, ac-
cording to his input b, if Alice and Bob follow the protocol
honestly. The security properties state: that if Bob fol-
lows the protocol honestly and Alice follows any dishon-
est strategy, Alice cannot learn Bob’s input b anywhere
in spacetime; and that if Alice follows the protocol hon-
estly and Bob follows any dishonest strategy, Bob cannot
obtain xi in Ri and xj in Rj , for any pair of different
numbers i and j from the set Im. We state these proper-
ties more precisely below in the ideal case in which Bob’s
outputs do not have any errors, and then in a scenario in
which Bob’s outputs have a small fraction of errors. We
consider that b is initially completely unknown to Alice,
i.e. from her perspective, Bob chooses b randomly from
Im. Similarly, we consider that xi is initially completely
unknown to Bob, i.e. from his perspective, Alice chooses
xi randomly from the previously agreed set, for i ∈ Im.
A. The ideal case of no errors
1. Correctness
For ǫcor ≥ 0, we say a SCOT protocol is ǫcor−correct
if, when Alice and Bob follow the protocol honestly, the
probability P that Bob outputs xb in Rb satisfies P ≥
1 − ǫcor, for any inputs x0,x1, . . . ,xm−1 by Alice from
the agreed sets, and for any input b ∈ Im by Bob. We
say a SCOT protocol is perfectly correct if it is 0−correct.
2. Security
For ǫAlice ≥ 0, we say a SCOT protocol is ǫAlice−secure
against dishonest Alice if, when Bob follows the proto-
col honestly and Alice follows any cheating strategy, the
probability PAlice that Alice guesses Bob’s input b any-
where in spacetime satisfies PAlice ≤ 1m + ǫAlice. We say
a SCOT protocol is perfectly secure against dishonest
Alice if it is 0−secure against dishonest Alice. We say
a SCOT protocol is unconditionally secure against dis-
honest Alice if it is ǫAlice−secure against dishonest Alice
with ǫAlice approaching zero by increasing some security
parameter, for any cheating strategy by Alice that is al-
lowed by quantum theory and relativity.
For ǫBob ≥ 0, we say a SCOT protocol is ǫBob−secure
against dishonest Bob if, when Alice follows the proto-
col honestly and Bob follows any cheating strategy, the
probability PBob that Bob outputs xi in Ri and xj in Rj
satisfies PBob ≤ ǫBob, for any pair of different numbers
i, j from the set Im. Ideally, we would define a SCOT
protocol to be unconditionally secure against dishonest
Bob if it is ǫBob−secure against dishonest Bob with ǫBob
approaching 1
d
by increasing some security parameter, for
any cheating strategy by Bob that is allowed by quantum
theory and relativity, where d is the minimum of the num-
ber of possible values of xi, for i ∈ Im. That is, ideally,
we would like to guarantee that when a security parame-
ter tends to infinity, Bob should not be able to do better
than following the honest protocol to obtain some xb in
Rb and to make a random guess of some other xj in Rj .
However, here we can satisfy a weaker definition of secu-
rity: we say a SCOT protocol is unconditionally secure
against dishonest Bob if it is ǫBob−secure against dishon-
est Bob with ǫBob approaching zero by increasing the size
of Alice’s input messages and possibly by increasing some
other security parameters, for any cheating strategy by
Bob that is allowed by quantum theory and relativity.
B. Tolerating a small fraction of errors
We generalize the previous definition of one-out-of-m
SCOT to allow a small fraction of errors in Bob’s output.
7We consider that Alice and Bob agree that Alice’s inputs
are of the form xi ∈ {0, 1}ni, for an agreed number ni ∈
N, and for i ∈ Im. Alice and Bob agree on parameters
γi ≥ 0, for i ∈ Im. In following sections we present
protocols to implement one-out-of-m SCOT considering
the particular case ni = n and γi = γ, for i ∈ Im.
1. Correctness
For ǫcor ≥ 0, we say a SCOT protocol is ǫcor−correct
if, when Alice and Bob follow the protocol honestly, the
probability P that Bob outputs a message x′b in Rb satis-
fying d(x′b,xb) ≤ nbγb satisfies P ≥ 1−ǫcor, for any inputs
x0,x1, . . . ,xm−1 by Alice from the agreed sets, and for
any input b ∈ Im by Bob. We say a SCOT protocol is
perfectly correct if it is 0−correct.
2. Security
For ǫBob ≥ 0, we say a SCOT protocol is ǫBob−secure
against dishonest Bob if, when Alice follows the protocol
honestly and Bob follows any cheating strategy, the prob-
ability PBob that Bob outputs messages x
′
i in Ri and x
′
j in
Rj satisfying d(x
′
i,xi) ≤ niγi and d(x′j ,xj) ≤ njγj satis-
fies PBob ≤ ǫBob, for any pair of different numbers i and
j from the set Im. We say a SCOT protocol is uncondi-
tionally secure against dishonest Bob if it is ǫBob−secure
against dishonest Bob with ǫBob approaching zero by in-
creasing the size of Alice’s input messages and possibly
some other security parameters, for any cheating strategy
by Bob that is allowed by quantum theory and relativity.
Security against dishonest Alice is defined as in the ideal
case of no errors.
IV. AN UNCONDITIONALLY SECURE
ONE-OUT-OF-m SCOT PROTOCOL PQC WITH
LONG-DISTANCE QUANTUM
COMMUNICATION
We introduce the protocol PQC for one-out-of-m
SCOT, which extends straightforwardly the protocol for
one-out-of-two SCOT of Ref. [1]. The label ‘QC’ stands
for ‘quantum communication’, as the protocol PQC re-
quires quantum communication among Bob’s distant
agents. The protocol PQC uses a subroutine PSR intro-
duced below.
The setting is the following. Alice has trusted agentsA
and Ai, for i ∈ Im. Bob has trusted agents B and Bi, for
i ∈ Im. Alice and Bob agree in a reference frame F and in
m pairwise spacelike separated output spacetime regions
R0, R1, . . . , Rm−1. Each of Alice’s (Bob’s) agents con-
trols a secure laboratory. It is useful to consider that the
agents A and B have adjacent laboratories, and that the
agents Ai and Bi have adjacent laboratories, for i ∈ Im.
Alice’s agents share secure and authenticated classical
channels, and Bob’s agents share secure and authenti-
cated quantum channels. There is a quantum channel
between A and B. There is a classical channel between
Ai and Bi, for i ∈ Im.
A. The subroutine PSR
The following protocol was used as a subroutine in Ref.
[1] for the case m = 2. We extend this protocol here for
the case m ≥ 2 and denote it as PSR.
1. Alice’s agent A encodes a random n−bit string r
in a quantum state |ψs
r
〉 =⊗j∈[n]|ψsjrj 〉 of n BB84
states, where s is a random n−bit string denoting
the bases. A sends |ψsr〉 to B, who receives it in G.
2. B obtains his input number b ∈ Im in G and redi-
rects the received state |ψsr〉 to his colleague Bb,
who receives it in the causal past of at least one
spacetime point of Rb.
3. For i ∈ Im, A sends a copy of s to her colleague Ai,
who receives it in the causal past of Qi.
4. For i ∈ Im, Ai gives s to Bi at the spacetime point
Qi.
5. Bb measures the quantum state |ψsr〉 in the basis
labeled by s, and obtains a n−bit string r′ in Rb.
1. Correctness
In the ideal case in which there are not any errors nor
any losses, Bob’s output r′ equals r with unit probability.
2. Security against dishonest Alice
Since Bob does not transmit any physical systems to
Alice, Alice cannot obtain any information about Bob’s
input b. Thus, Alice cannot guess Bob’s input b with
probability greater than 1
m
.
3. Security against dishonest Bob
For the case m = 2, it was shown in Ref. [1] that if
Alice follows the protocol honestly and Bob follows an
arbitrary cheating strategy allowed by quantum theory
and relativity, the probability PBob that Bob outputs
n−bit strings r0 = r in R0 and r1 = r in R1 satisfies
PBob ≤
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
2
)n
. It was also shown that for a suffi-
ciently small positive parameter γ, the probability P γBob
that Bob outputs n−bit strings r0 in R0 and r1 in R1
satisfying d(r0, r) ≤ nγ and d(r1, r) ≤ nγ decreases ex-
ponentially with n. In particular, we have P γBob ≤ (qγ)n,
where qγ = 2
2h(γ)
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
2
)
< 1, for γ < 0.015, and
8where h(γ) = −γ log2 γ − (1− γ) log2(1− γ) denotes the
binary entropy of γ [1]. As we show below, these security
properties hold for all m ≥ 2.
Consider any pair of different numbers i, j ∈ Im. In an
arbitrary cheating strategy by Bob allowed by quantum
theory and relativity in which he tries to output ri = r
in Ri and rj = r in Rj , B applies some quantum op-
eration on the quantum state received from Alice and
outputs two quantum systems B0 and B1 that he sends
to his colleagues Bi and Bj, respectively. Then, after re-
ceiving s form Alice’s agents, Bi and Bj apply respective
measurements M˜0,s and M˜1,s, and obtain respective mea-
surement outcomes ri and rj . This cheating strategy is
the same as for the case m = 2, where i = 0 and j = 1.
Thus, we see that the security conditions stated in the
previous paragraph hold for any pair of different numbers
i, j ∈ Im, both in the case of perfect outcomes, for which
we have PBob ≤
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
2
)n
; and in the case in which
a small fraction of errors γ ≥ 0 is tolerated, in particu-
lar P γBob ≤ (qγ)n, where qγ = 22h(γ)
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
2
)
< 1, for
γ < 0.015.
B. The one-out-of-m SCOT protocol PQC
1. Alice and Bob implement the subroutine PSR,
where r ∈ {0, 1}n is the message encoded by A in G
and b ∈ Im is B’s input in G, and where r′ ∈ {0, 1}n
is Bb’s output in Rb.
2. For i ∈ Im, A sends a copy of r to Ai, who receives
it in the causal past of Qi.
3. For i ∈ Im, Ai obtains her input message xi ∈
{0, 1}n in the causal past of Qi.
4. For i ∈ Im, Ai gives ti = xi ⊕ r to Bi at the space-
time point Qi.
5. Bb computes the message x′b = r′ ⊕ tb and outputs
it in Rb.
1. Comments
Different variations of this protocol can be considered.
For example, Bob’s agents having quantum memories
have more freedom on the time at which they receive, pro-
cess and transmit classical and quantum information. On
the other hand, if Bob does not have any quantum mem-
ories, Bob’s agent B must redirect the quantum states
as soon as he receives them from Alice’s agent A; and
the transmission of the quantum state from A to B must
be completed within a sufficiently short time interval so
that Bob’s agent Bb is able to complete the correspond-
ing quantum measurement on it within the output space-
time region Rb; a physical implementation of this proto-
col seems plausible in some scenarios using photons as
the physical systems encoding the quantum states, for
example. Additionally, here we have considered that the
subroutine PSR is implemented with BB84 states, but
generalizations with other sets of non-mutually orthog-
onal states can be devised. Furthermore, we note that
Bob’s secure and authenticated quantum channels can be
implemented via the teleportation [27] protocol if Bob’s
agents share entangled states and authenticated classical
channels, or via the quantum one-time pad [28] if Bob’s
agents share secret classical keys and authenticated quan-
tum channels.
2. Correctness
In the ideal case that there are not any errors nor any
losses, Bob outputs r′ = r in Rb in the subroutine PSR,
hence, Bob outputs x′b = xb in Rb in the protocol PQC.
In an implementation of PSR in which Bob outputs r′
in Rb satisfying d(r
′, r) ≤ γn, Bob’s output x′b in Rb
satisfies d(x′b,xb) ≤ γn, for γ ≥ 0.
3. Security against dishonest Alice
Like in the subroutine PSR, Bob does not transmit
any physical systems to Alice in the protocol PQC, hence,
Alice cannot obtain any information about Bob’s input b.
Thus, Alice cannot guess Bob’s input b with probability
greater than 1
m
. Therefore the protocol PQC is perfectly
secure against dishonest Alice.
4. Security against dishonest Bob
For any pair of different numbers i, j ∈ Im, the
probability PBob that Bob outputs x
′
i ∈ {0, 1}n in Ri
and x′j ∈ {0, 1}n in Rj in the protocol PQC satisfy-
ing d(x′i,xi) ≤ nγ and d(x′j ,xj) ≤ nγ is equal to the
probability that Bob outputs ri ∈ {0, 1}n in Ri and
rj ∈ {0, 1}n in Rj in the subroutine PSR satisfying
d(ri, r) ≤ nγ and d(rj , r) ≤ nγ. Thus, from the security
properties of the subroutine PSR, it follows straightfor-
wardly that if errors are not tolerated, i.e. if γ = 0, the
protocol PQC is ǫ−secure against dishonest Bob, with
ǫ =
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
2
)n
. Since ǫ decreases exponentially with n,
PQC is unconditionally secure against dishonest Bob.
Similarly, if the protocol PQC tolerates a fraction of
errors γ, the protocol PQC is ǫγ−secure against dishonest
Bob, with ǫγ = (qγ)
n, where qγ = 2
2h(γ)
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
2
)
< 1,
for γ < 0.015. Since ǫγ decreases exponentially with
n, for γ < 0.015, PQC is unconditionally secure against
dishonest Bob in this case too.
9V. ONE-OUT-OF-m DISTRIBUTED QUANTUM
ACCESS WITH CLASSICAL MEMORY
In this section we introduce a task that we denote as
one-out-of-m distributed quantum access with classical
memory (DQACM), which for simplicity of the exposi-
tion we often refer to simply as DQACM. This task works
as a primitive to construct one-out-of-m SCOT protocols
in which Bob’s agents only need to communicate classical
information.
We define one-out-of-m DQACM as follows. Previ-
ous to implementing a DQACM protocol, Alice and Bob
agree on the integer m ≥ 2; on finite sets of classi-
cal messages Ω0,Ω1, . . . ,Ωm−1, Ωoutcome ⊆ Ω0 × Ω1 ×
· · · × Ωm−1, and Λbasis; and on a set of quantum states
∆ = {
∣∣Ψsr〉∣∣r ∈ Ωoutcome, s ∈ Λbasis}. In general, we may
set Ωoutcome ⊆ Ω0×Ω1×· · ·×Ωm−1, but here we consider
Ωoutcome = Ω0 × Ω1 × · · · × Ωm−1. A DQACM protocol
consists of two stages.
In stage I, Alice encodes a string of messages r =
(r0, r1, . . . , rm−1) ∈ Ωoutcome in a quantum state
∣∣Ψsr〉A ∈
∆ of a quantum system A, using the extra classical mes-
sage s ∈ Λbasis. The message s may indicate, for ex-
ample, the basis used by Alice to prepare the state
∣∣Ψs
r
〉
,
from a set of possibly non-mutually orthogonal bases. Al-
ice gives the quantum state
∣∣Ψs
r
〉
A
to Bob. We consider
that Alice’s inputs are initially secret to Bob, i.e. from
Bob’s perspective, Alice chooses ri randomly from Ωi, for
i ∈ Im, and s randomly from Λbasis. Bob inputs a num-
ber c ∈ Im, initially secret to Alice, i.e. from Alice’s per-
spective, Bob chooses c randomly from Im. Bob applies a
quantum measurement Mc on the received quantum state∣∣Ψs
r
〉
A
and obtains a classical measurement outcome d.
Stage II consists of two steps. In the first step, Alice
gives the classical message s to Bob. In the second step,
Bob applies a function f on (c,d, s) giving as output a
classical message r′c, i.e. r
′
c = f(c,d, s).
Ideally, a protocol for one-out-of-m DQACM should
satisfy a correctness and a security condition. Broadly
speaking, the correctness property says that if Alice and
Bob follow the protocol honestly, Bob’s output r′c is equal
to Alice’s input rc, or is sufficiently close to Alice’s input
rc, according to a predetermined threshold. The security
condition states that in distributed cheating strategies
by Bob involving two agents of Bob, B0 and B1, who
receive Alice’s message s, and who cannot communicate
with each other after receiving s, B0 and B1 cannot both
output Alice’s inputs ri and rj – or messages sufficiently
close to ri and rj , according to a predetermined threshold
– respectively, for any pair of different numbers i, j ∈ Im.
Fig. 3 illustrates the task of one-out-of-m DQACM.
We see that by construction, in the defined task of
one-out-of-m DQACM, Alice remains oblivious to Bob’s
input c, as she does not receive any physical system from
Bob. This obliviousness property, as well as the prop-
erties of correctness and security against dishonest Bob
allow us to use one-out-of-m DQACM to construct cor-
rect and secure one-out-of-m SCOT.
FIG. 3. One-out-of-m DQACM implemented between Alice
and Bob. The horizontal red arrows represent communication
from Alice to Bob. The vertical green arrows represent inputs
and outputs by Bob. The green boxes represent processing
by Bob. The task consists in two stages. By definition, we
consider that Alice implements the task honestly. Alice’s ac-
tions consist, in stage I, in giving to Bob a quantum state |Ψsr〉
encoding the string r = (r0, r1, . . . , rm−1) in a basis labeled
by a classical string s; and in stage II, in giving s to Bob.
Left: Bob implements the task honestly. In stage I, Bob in-
puts a number c ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m − 1} and applies a quantum
measurement Mc, depending on c, on the received quantum
state |Ψsr〉, and obtains a classical measurement outcome d.
In stage II, Bob applies a function f on c, d and s, and ob-
tains Alice’s input rc (or a message r
′
c close to rc according to
a predetermined threshold). Right: Bob follows a dishonest
strategy. In stage I, Bob applies an arbitrary quantum oper-
ation (large green box) on the received quantum state |Ψsr〉
and outputs two quantum systems B0 and B1, which he sends
to his agents B0 and B1. In stage II, Bob’s agents B0 and B1
(small green boxes) cannot communicate, as represented by
the thick black line. Bob’s agent B0 (B1) use the classical mes-
sage s and the received quantum system B0 (B1) to output a
classical message r′i (r
′
j). In a secure one-out-of-m DQACM
protocol, the probability that Bob’s inputs r′i and r
′
j are equal
to Alice’s inputs ri and rj (or close to Alice’s inputs ri and
rj according to a predetermined threshold) is negligible, for
any pair of different numbers i, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m− 1}.
We explain why we have denoted this task as ‘one-out-
of-m distributed quantum access with classical memory’.
First, in the honest protocol Bob chooses to access one
out of m messages that Alice encodes in a quantum state.
Second, in the honest protocol, we can consider that Bob
has only classical memory, as he receives the quantum
state from Alice and is forced to apply a quantum mea-
surement and then apply further classical processing on
his outcomes after receiving the classical message s from
Alice. Third, in a dishonest cheating strategy by Bob,
we can consider that he outputs two quantum systems
B0 and B1 and distributes them to his agents B0 and B1,
who without communicating – because they must obtain
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their outputs at spacelike separated spacetime regions,
for instance – must respectively output Alice’s inputs ri
and rj after receiving Alice’s classical message s, for some
pair of different numbers i, j ∈ Im.
We define precisely the correctness and security condi-
tions in two broad scenarios: an ideal scenario in which
there are not errors in Bob’s output, and a more general
scenario in which there is a small fraction of errors in
Bob’s output.
A. The ideal case of no errors
1. Correctness
For ǫcor ≥ 0, we say a protocol to implement one-out-
of-m DQACM is ǫcor−correct if, when Alice and Bob
follow the protocol honestly, the probability P that Bob
outputs rc satisfies P ≥ 1 − ǫcor, for any input c ∈ Im
by Bob. We say a protocol to implement one-out-of-m
DQACM is perfectly correct if it is 0−correct.
2. Security
For ǫBob ≥ 0, we say a protocol to implement one-
out-of-m DQACM is ǫBob−secure against dishonest Bob
if, when Alice follows the protocol honestly, for any pair
of different numbers i and j from the set Im, for any
quantum operation O independent of r and independent
of s applied by Bob on the quantum state |Ψs
r
〉A that
produces at least two quantum systems B0 and B1, and
for any sets of quantum measurements
{
M˜
s
0
}
s∈Λbasis and{
M˜
s
1
}
s∈Λbasis , the probability to obtain respective out-
comes ri and rj , by respectively applying M˜
s
0 on B0 and
M˜
s
1 on B1, is not greater than ǫBob. We say a protocol
to implement one-out-of-m DQACM is unconditionally
secure against dishonest Bob if it is ǫBob−secure against
dishonest Bob with ǫBob approaching zero by increasing
the size of Alice’s input messages and possibly some other
security parameters.
B. Tolerating a small fraction of errors
We generalize the previous definition of one-out-of-m
DQACM to allow a small fraction of errors in Bob’s out-
put. We consider that Alice and Bob agree that Alice’s
inputs are of the form ri ∈ {0, 1}ni, for an agreed num-
ber ni ∈ N, and for i ∈ Im. Alice and Bob agree on
parameters γi ≥ 0, for i ∈ Im.
1. Correctness
For ǫcor ≥ 0, we say a protocol to implement one-out-
of-m DQACM is ǫcor−correct if, when Alice and Bob
follow the protocol honestly, the probability P that Bob
outputs a message r′c satisfying d(r
′
c, rc) ≤ ncγc satisfies
P ≥ 1 − ǫcor, for any input c ∈ Im by Bob. We say a
protocol to implement one-out-of-m DQACM is perfectly
correct if it is 0−correct.
2. Security
For ǫBob ≥ 0, we say a protocol to implement one-out-
of-m DQACM is ǫBob−secure against dishonest Bob if,
when Alice follows the protocol honestly, for any pair of
different numbers i, j ∈ Im, for any quantum operation
O independent of r and independent of s applied by Bob
on the quantum state |Ψs
r
〉A that produces at least two
quantum systems B0 and B1, and for any sets of quantum
measurements
{
M˜
s
0
}
s∈Λbasis and
{
M˜
s
1
}
s∈Λbasis , the prob-
ability to obtain respective outcomes r′i and r
′
j satisfying
d(r′i, ri) ≤ γini and d(r′j , rj) ≤ γjnj , by respectively ap-
plying M˜
s
0 on B0 and M˜
s
1 on B1, is not greater than ǫBob.
We say a protocol to implement one-out-of-m DQACM
is unconditionally secure against dishonest Bob if it is
ǫBob−secure against dishonest Bob with ǫBob approach-
ing zero by increasing the size of Alice’s input messages
and possibly some other security parameters.
VI. A CLASS C OF UNCONDITIONALLY
SECURE PROTOCOLS FOR ONE-OUT-OF-m
DQACM
We introduce a class C of protocols to implement
one-out-of-m DQACM. We define a set Ω with l dis-
tinct elements, for some integer l ≥ 2. We define
Λ = {(a0, a1, . . . , am−1)|ai ∈ Im and ai 6= ai′ if i 6=
i′, for i, i′ ∈ Im}, i.e. the set Λ is in one-to-one correspon-
dence with the set of permutations ofm distinct elements.
We define Ωoutcome = Ω
nm and Λbasis = Λ
n. This means
that we consider strings s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) ∈ Λn, ri =
(r1i , r
2
i , . . . , r
n
i ) ∈ Ωn and r = (r0, r1, . . . , rm−1) ∈ Ωnm,
i.e. with sj = (sj0, s
j
1, . . . , s
j
m−1) ∈ Λ and rji ∈ Ω, for
j ∈ [n] and i ∈ Im. We note that the number of elements
of the set Λ is m!, hence, the number of elements of the
set Λn is (m!)n. Similarly, as the number of elements of
the set Ω is l, the number of elements of the set Ωn is
(l)n.
Alice generates the quantum state |Ψsr〉A encoded in a
quantum system with Hilbert space A, where the strings
s ∈ Λn and ri ∈ Ωn are randomly generated by her, for
i ∈ Im. Alice gives the quantum state |Ψsr〉A to Bob. The
quantum state is of the form
∣∣Ψs
r
〉
A
=
⊗
i∈Im
j∈[n]
∣∣αi
r
j
i
〉
A
j
s
j
i
, (2)
where r = (r0, r1, . . . , rm−1) denotes the string ofm mes-
sages encoded by Alice, and where the Hilbert space A
11
is a tensor product of mn Hilbert spaces Aji , as follows,
A =
⊗
i∈Im
j∈[n]
A
j
i , (3)
with the dimension of the Hilbert space Aji being equal to
l for all j ∈ [n] and all i ∈ Im, and where Di = {|αir〉}r∈Ω
is an orthonormal basis of an l-dimensional Hilbert space,
for i ∈ Im. We define
λ = max
i6=i′
∣∣〈αir|αi′r′〉∣∣2, (4)
where the maximum is taken over all r, r′ ∈ Ω and over
all i, i′ ∈ Im with i 6= i′.
Bob generates his input c ∈ Im and applies a quantum
measurement Mc on the received quantum state |Ψsr〉A.
The quantum measurement Mc consists in measuring the
quantum subsystem Aji of A in the basis Dc, whose clas-
sical measurement outcome is denoted by dji , for j ∈ [n]
and i ∈ Im. We denote dj = (dj0, dj1, . . . , djm−1), for
j ∈ [n], and Bob’s total classical measurement outcome
by d = (d1, d2, . . . , dn). We note that the outcomes sat-
isfy dj
s
j
c
= rjc , because the quantum system A
j
s
j
c
is pre-
pared by Alice in the quantum state
∣∣αc
r
j
c
〉
, i.e. in the
basis Dc encoding the classical outcome rjc , for j ∈ [n].
Thus, for c ∈ Im, following the protocol honestly and us-
ing c, d and s, Bob can decode Alice’s input rc, i.e. there
exists a function f that when applied on (c,d, s) gives as
output Alice’s input rc. Therefore, in the ideal case that
there are not errors nor losses, the protocols of this class
are perfectly correct.
In order to guarantee security against dishonest Bob,
the set of bases {Di}i∈Im is chosen to satisfy the con-
straint
λ < 1. (5)
For fixed values of l and m, the smaller the value of λ is,
the greater the security that can be guaranteed. For this
reason, it is preferable that the bases Di are mutually
unbiased, i.e. that |〈αir|αi
′
r′〉|2 = l−1 for all r, r′ ∈ Ω
and all i, i′ ∈ Im with i 6= i′, in which case λ = l−1.
For example, in the case m = 2, we can set l = 2, and
a pair of mutually unbiased bases can be given by the
computational and Hadamard bases.
In order to quantitatively prove the security against
dishonest Bob in the examples given in this section, we
also require that the set of bases {Di}i∈Im satisfies the
constraint that there exists a maximally entangled state
|φ〉 of two l-dimensional quantum systems a and a′ such
that |φ〉 can be expressed by
|φ〉a′a = 1√
l
∑
r∈Ω
∣∣αir〉a′ ⊗ ∣∣αir〉a, (6)
for all i ∈ Im.
From (2) – (6), we show below that if the protocols of
the class defined above do not tolerate any errors in Bob’s
output then they are ǫBob−secure against dishonest Bob,
with
ǫBob =
(
m− 1 +√λ
m
)n
. (7)
Thus, since λ < 1 as given by (5), we have that ǫBob → 0
exponentially with n, meaning that the protocol is un-
conditionally secure against dishonest Bob.
We can straightforwardly extend the class of protocols
above to tolerate a small fraction of errors. For example,
consider protocols with Ω = {0, 1}, i.e. ri is a string of
n bits, for i ∈ Im. Bob’s output r′c may be considered
correct if d(r′c, rc) ≤ nγ for some small allowed error
rate γ ≥ 0, i.e. if the number of bit errors in r′c with
respect to rc is not greater than nγ, for c ∈ Im. In this
case, we show below that the considered protocols are
ǫ
γ
Bob−secure against dishonest Bob with
ǫ
γ
Bob =
[
22h(γ)
(
m− 1 +√λ
m
)]n
, (8)
for some γ ∈ (0,Γ(λ)m ), where Γ(λ)m is the smallest solution
to the following equation
22h(Γ
(λ)
m )
(
m− 1 +
√
λ
m
)
= 1, (9)
which satisfies Γ
(λ)
m ≤ 12 , where we recall that h(γ) de-
notes the binary entropy of γ. We note from (9) that
since γ < Γ
(λ)
m , the term inside the brackets in (8) is
smaller than unity, hence, ǫγBob given by (8) decreases
exponentially with n. Thus, the protocols are uncondi-
tionally secure against dishonest Bob.
We give two specific examples below of protocols for
one-out-of-m DQACM of the previous class that satisfy
(2) – (6), from which the security bounds (7) and (8)
follow.
A. Example 1
We consider the case m = l = 2 with Ω = {0, 1}. We
set the state |φ〉 = |Φ+〉, where |Φ+〉 is the Bell state
|Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉|0〉+ |1〉|1〉). (10)
Since l = 2, D0 and D1 are qubit orthogonal bases, which
without loss of generality we fix on the same plane of the
Bloch sphere. Without loss of generality we set D0 to be
the computational basis, given by the states |α0r〉 = |r〉,
for r ∈ {0, 1}. The basis D1 is defined by the states
|α1r〉 = (−1)r cos
(θ
2
)
|r〉 + sin
(θ
2
)
|r¯〉, (11)
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for r ∈ {0, 1} and for some θ ∈ (0, π). In this example,
we have
λ = max
{
cos2
(θ
2
)
, sin2
(θ
2
)}
. (12)
Since θ ∈ (0, π), we have λ < 1, hence, (5) holds. It is
easy to see that |α10〉|α10〉 + |α11〉|α11〉 = |0〉|0〉 + |1〉|1〉 for
any θ, hence, by setting |φ〉 = |Φ+〉, (6) holds too. From
(7), in this example we have that the DQACM protocol
is ǫθ−secure against dishonest Bob, with
ǫθ =
(
1 +
√
λ
2
)n
, (13)
where λ is given by (12). Since ǫθ decreases exponentially
with n, the DQACM protocol is unconditionally secure
against dishonest Bob, for θ ∈ (0, π).
In this example, in order to enhance the security, it is
preferable to have θ = pi2 , in which case D0 and D1 corre-
spond respectively to the computational and Hadamard
bases, which are mutually unbiased, giving from (12) the
value λ = 12 . In this case, it follows from (13) that the
DQACM protocol is ǫ
pi
2−secure against dishonest Bob,
with
ǫ
pi
2 =
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
2
)n
. (14)
B. Example 2
We set arbitrary m ≥ 2, with Ω = {0, 1}, hence l = 2.
Since l = 2, Di are qubit orthogonal bases, for i ∈ Im.
We set the bases to lie on the same plane of the Bloch
sphere. Without loss of generality we set this plane to
be the x-z plane, and we set the basis D0 to lie on the
z axis, i.e. D0 is the computational basis, which is given
by the states |α0r〉 = |r〉, for r ∈ {0, 1}. The other bases
can be expressed by the states
|αir〉 = (−1)r cos
(θi
2
)
|r〉 + sin
(θi
2
)
|r¯〉, (15)
for r ∈ {0, 1}, for different parameters θi ∈
(
0, π
)
, for
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m− 1}, which without loss of generality we
order like θ1 < θ2 < · · · < θm−1. In this example, we can
set
θi = i
π
m
, (16)
for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m− 1}, which gives
λ = cos2
( π
2m
)
, (17)
satisfying (5), for m ≥ 2. As in the Example 1 above,
we set |φ〉 = |Φ+〉, given by (10), which as above satisfies
(6). From (7), in this example we have that the DQACM
protocol is ǫm−secure against dishonest Bob, with
ǫm =
(
m− 1 + cos( pi2m)
m
)n
. (18)
Since ǫm decreases exponentially with n, the DQACM
protocol is unconditionally secure against dishonest Bob,
for m ≥ 2.
C. Security against dishonest Bob
We show below that the class C of DQACM proto-
cols described in this section satisfying (2) – (6) are
ǫBob−secure against dishonest Bob in the case that er-
rrors in Bob’s output are not tolerated, and ǫγBob−secure
against dishonest Bob in the case that a small fraction
γ of errors is tolerated, with ǫBob and ǫ
γ
Bob given by (7)
and (8), respectively.
By definition, security against dishonest Bob is ana-
lyzed with respect to cheating strategies of the following
form. Bob receives the quantum state
∣∣Ψsr〉A from Alice
in the quantum system A. Bob then applies any quan-
tum operation O on the quantum state
∣∣Ψsr〉A, and pos-
sibly and ancillary quantum system E or arbitrary finite
Hilbert space dimension. Bob then partitions his total
system AE into two quantum systems B0 and B1. After
receiving s from Alice, Bob applies a quantum measure-
ment M˜
s
0 on B0 and a quantum measurement M˜
s
1 on B1,
whose respective outcomes are denoted by e0 and e1. We
show below that the probability pn that Bob’s outputs
satisfy e0 = rl0 and e1 = rl1 satisfies
pn ≤
(
m− 1 +
√
λ
m
)n
, (19)
for any pair of different numbers l0, l1 ∈ Im. We also
show that for Alice’s inputs of the form r0, r1, . . . , rm−1 ∈
{0, 1}n, the probability p′n that Bob’s outputs satisfiy
d(e0, rl0) ≤ nγ and d(e1, rl1) ≤ nγ satisfies
p′n ≤ 22nh(γ)
(
m− 1 +√λ
m
)n
, (20)
for any pair of different numbers l0, l1 ∈ Im, and for some
γ ∈ (0,Γ(λ)m ), where Γ(λ)m is the smallest solution to the
equation
22h(Γ
(λ)
m )
(
m− 1 +√λ
m
)
= 1, (21)
which satisfies Γ
(λ)
m ≤ 12 . Thus, from (7) – (9), and from
(19) – (21), it follows that the class of DQACM pro-
tocols described in this section satisfying (2) – (6) are
ǫBob−secure against dishonest Bob in the case that er-
rors in Bob’s output are not tolerated, and ǫγBob−secure
against dishonest Bob in the case that a small fraction
γ of errors is tolerated, with ǫBob and ǫ
γ
Bob given by (7)
and (8), respectively.
The most general quantum operationO consists in per-
forming some joint unitary operation U , independent of
s and independent of r, on the quantum state |Ψsr〉 of the
quantum system A and a fixed quantum state |χ〉 of an
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ancillary system E, which we assume to be of arbitrary
finite Hilbert space dimension, to obtain the state
|Φs
r
〉B0B1 = UAE |Ψsr〉A|χ〉E , (22)
where for simplifying notation we have written r =
(r0, r1, . . . , rm−1), where AE = B0B1, and where the
quantum systems B0 and B1 have arbitrary finite di-
mensions. Bob partitions the global system AE into two
quantum systems B0 and B1. Then, for i ∈ {0, 1}, Bob
applies a projective measurement M˜
s
i = {Πeiis}ei∈Ωn on
Bi and obtains the outcome ei. Bob’s cheating probabil-
ity pn is given by
pn =
1
(l)mn(m!)n
∑
s∈Λn
r∈Ωnm
〈Φs
r
|Πrl00s ⊗Π
rl1
1s |Φsr〉, (23)
where r ∈ Ωnm denotes that ri ∈ Ωn for i ∈ Im, as we
have used the notation r = (r0, r1, . . . , rm−1), and where
we recall that l0, l1 ∈ Im with l0 6= l1. Then, using (2) –
(6), and in particular, using the property of non-perfect
distinguishability of non-orthogonal quantum states ex-
ploited in Alice’s quantum state preparation (2), as quan-
tified by (4) and (5), we show the bound (19) below.
From (19) and (23), it is straightforward to de-
rive (20). Consider a projective measurement M˜
s,a
i =
{Πei⊕ais }ei∈Ωn on Bi for any n−bit string a in the case
Ω = {0, 1} and |Ω| = l = 2, where we recall that ‘⊕’
denotes bit-wise sum modulo 2. Extending (23), Bob’s
cheating probability p′n is given by
p′n =
1
(l)mn(m!)n
∑
a:w(a≤nγ)
b:w(b≤nγ)
∑
s∈Λn
r∈Ωnm
〈Φsr|Πrl0⊕a0s ⊗Π
rl1
⊕b
1s |Φsr〉,
(24)
where we recall that w(a) denotes the Hamming weight
of the n−bit string a, i.e. the number of bit entries of a
equal to ‘1’. The bound (19) applies for any pair of pro-
jective measurements on B0 and B1, hence, in particular
for the projective measurement M˜
s,a
i = {Πei⊕ais }ei∈Ωn on
Bi, for a ∈ {0, 1}n and i ∈ {0, 1}. It follows from (19),
(23) and (24) that
p′n ≤
∑
a:w(a≤nγ)
b:w(b≤nγ)
(
m− 1 +
√
λ
m
)n
≤ 22nh(γ)
(
m− 1 +
√
λ
m
)n
, (25)
where in the second line we have used that the number of
n−bit strings a with Hamming weight not greater than
nγ is upper bounded by 2nh(γ), for γ ≤ 12 , which is shown
in section 1.4 of Ref. [29], and where h(γ) is the binary
entropy of γ. The bound (20) follows.
1. Proof of the bound (19)
We note that our protocol is mathematically equiva-
lent to the following procedure. First, Alice takes the
following actions. She prepares a pair of l-dimensional
quantum systems Cji and A
j
i in the state |φ〉Cj
i
A
j
i
given
by (6) , for i ∈ Im and j ∈ [n]. More precisely, Alice pre-
pares a global quantum system with Hilbert space C⊗A,
where A is given by (3), and similarly C is given by
C =
⊗
i∈Im
j∈[n]
C
j
i . (26)
The quantum system CA is prepared in the quantum
state
|Φ〉CA =
⊗
i∈Im
j∈[n]
|φ〉
C
j
i
A
j
i
. (27)
Alice keeps the system C and she sends the system A to
Bob. Then, Alice measures C in the orthonormal basis{∣∣Ψs
r
〉}
r∈Ωnm according to her random value of s ∈ Λn,
where r = (r0, r1, . . . , rm−1) ∈ Ωnm means that ri ∈ Ωn,
for i ∈ Im. With probability l−mn, Alice measures
∣∣Ψs
r
〉
C
and A projects into the state |Ψsr〉A. Bob’s unitary oper-
ation U in his cheating strategy commutes with Alice’s
measurements. Thus, we can consider that the global
system CB0B1, before Alice’s and Bob’s measurement
are implemented, is in the state
|Ψ〉CB0B1 =
(
1C ⊗ UB0B1
)|Φ〉CA|χ〉E , (28)
where we recall that B0B1 = AE, E is an ancilla,
and B0 and B1 have arbitrary finite Hilbert space di-
mensions. Then, Alice measures C in the orthonormal
basis
{∣∣Ψs
r
〉}
r∈Ωnm according to her random value of
s ∈ Λn. With probability l−mn, Alice measures ∣∣Ψs
r
〉
C
and B0B1 projects into the state |Φsr〉B0B1 . After receiv-
ing s, Bob applies the projective measurement M˜
s
i on Bi,
for i ∈ {0, 1}.
Thus, Bob’s cheating probability pn given by (23)
equals
pn =
1
(m!)n
∑
s∈Λn
Tr
(
DsΨ
)
, (29)
where Ψ =
(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|)
CB0B1
and
Ds =
∑
r∈Ωnm
(∣∣Ψsr〉〈Ψsr∣∣)C ⊗ (Πrl00s )B0 ⊗ (Πrl11s )B1 ,
where we recall that l0, l1 ∈ Im and l0 6= l1.
We derive the bound (19) with the help of two lemmas
of Ref. [30]. Before stating these lemmas we provide
some useful notation. We denote by H the Hilbert space
of the global system CB0B1, which as said before is ar-
bitrary but finite dimensional. We denote by L(H) and
by P(H) the sets of linear operators and of positive semi-
definite operators on H, respectively. For A,B ∈ L(H),
the expression A ≥ B means that A − B ∈ P(H). For
A ∈ L(H), ‖A‖ denotes the Schatten ∞−norm of A,
which gives the largest singular value of A, and which
coincides with its largest eigenvalue if A ∈ P(H).
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Lemma 1. (Ref. [30]) Let A,B,L ∈ L(H) such that
A†A ≥ B†B. Then, it holds that ‖AL‖ ≥ ‖BL‖.
Lemma 2. (Ref. [30]) Let D1, D2, . . . , DN ∈ P(H), and
let {sk}k∈[N ] be a set of N mutually orthogonal permuta-
tions of [N ]. Then∥∥∥∥∑
i∈[N ]
Di
∥∥∥∥ ≤ ∑
k∈[N ]
max
i∈[N ]
∥∥∥√Di√Dsk(i)∥∥∥. (30)
It follows from Lemma 1 that for A,A′, B,B′ ∈ P(H)
satisfyingA′ ≥ A andB′ ≥ B, it holds that ‖
√
A′
√
B′‖ ≥
‖
√
A′
√
B‖≥ ‖
√
A
√
B‖ [30]. Thus, if A,A′, B,B′ are
projectors on H satisfying A′ ≥ A and B′ ≥ B then
‖A′B′‖ ≥ ‖AB‖. We use this property below.
To use Lemma 2, we consider the set of permuta-
tions of s ∈ Λn labeled by v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn) ∈ Λn
and given by s → sv = (s1v, s2v, . . . , snv) with sjv =(
s
j
vj ,0, s
j
vj ,1, . . . , s
j
vj ,m−1
)
being a permutation vj ∈ Λ of
sj = (sj0, s
j
1, . . . , s
j
m−1), for j ∈ [n]. This is a set of (m!)n
mutually orthogonal permutations, that is, sv 6= sw if
v 6= w, for all s ∈ Λn. To see this, consider a pair of
different elements v,w from the set Λn and any s ∈ Λn.
Since v 6= w, there exists at least a j′ ∈ [n] such that
vj
′ 6= wj′ , hence, sj′
v
=
(
s
j′
vj
′
,0
, s
j′
vj
′
,1
, . . . , s
j′
vj
′
,m−1
)
and
sj
′
w =
(
s
j′
wj
′
,0
, s
j′
wj
′
,1
, . . . , s
j′
wj
′
,m−1
)
are different permu-
tations of sj
′
= (sj
′
0 , s
j′
1 , . . . , s
j′
m−1), which means that
sj
′
v
6= sj′
w
and therefore that sv 6= sw.
We have
pn =
1
(m!)n
Tr
(∑
s∈Λn
DsΨ
)
≤ 1
(m!)n
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
s∈Λn
Ds
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ 1
(m!)n
∑
v∈Λn
max
s∈Λn
∥∥∥DsDsv∥∥∥, (31)
where in the first line we used the linearity of the trace,
in the second line we used the definition of the Schatten
∞−norm, and in the last line we used Lemma 2 and the
fact that Ds and Dsv are projectors.
In the following we use the notation r =
(r0, r1, . . . , rm−1) ∈ Ωnm, where ri ∈ Ωn, for i ∈ Im.
We define the projectors
Fs =
∑
r
(∣∣Ψs
r
〉〈
Ψs
r
∣∣)
C
⊗ (Πrl00s )B0 ⊗ 1B1 ,
Gsv =
∑
r
(∣∣Ψsvr 〉〈Ψsvr ∣∣)C ⊗ 1B0 ⊗ (Πrl11sv)B1 ,
(32)
for s,v ∈ Λn. We see that Fs and Gsv satisfy Ds ≤ Fs
and Dsv ≤ Gsv , for s,v ∈ Λn. Thus, we have from
Lemma 1 that
‖DsDsv‖2 ≤ ‖FsGsv‖2 = ‖FsGsvFs‖, (33)
where the equality follows from the property ‖A‖2 =
‖AA†‖ = ‖A†A‖ for any A ∈ L(H) [30] and from the
fact that Fs and Gsv are projectors. Then we show in
the Appendix A that
‖FsGsvFs‖ ≤ (λ)ωv , (34)
where ωv =
∣∣{j ∈ [n]|sj
vj ,l1
= sjl0}
∣∣, that is, ωv
is the number of entries vj of v corresponding to a
permutation that takes (a0, a1, . . . , am−1) ∈ Λ into
(?, . . . , ?, al0 , ?, . . . , ?) ∈ Λ, where al0 is in the l1th en-
try, and where ‘?’ denotes any allowed entry after the
permutation. For example, in the case l0 = 0 and
l1 = 1, ωv =
∣∣{j ∈ [n]|sj
vj ,1 = s
j
0}
∣∣ is the number of en-
tries vj of v corresponding to a permutation that takes
(a0, a1, . . . , am−1) ∈ Λ into (?, a0, ?, . . . , ?) ∈ Λ, where
‘?’ denotes any allowed entry after the permutation. As
explicitly stated by the notation, we see that ωv only de-
pends on v, but not on s. Thus, since for a fixed v ∈ Λn,
the upper bound on ‖FsGsvFs‖ given by (34) is the same
for any s ∈ Λn, we have from (31), (33) and (34) that
pn ≤ 1
(m!)n
∑
v∈Λn
(√
λ
)ωv
. (35)
We also note that the value of ωv does not depend on the
values of l0, l1, for any pair of different numbers l0, l1 ∈
Im; hence, the bound (35) holds for any pair of different
numbers l0, l1 ∈ Im.
We compute the sum in (35). There are exactly(
n
ω
)(
(m− 1)!)ω(m!− (m− 1)!)n−ω values of v ∈ Λn sat-
isfying ωv = ω. We can see this as follows. Consider a
v ∈ Λn such that ωv = ω. For this v, there are ω entries
vj which are permutations of m distinct elements that
take (a0, a1, . . . , am−1) ∈ Λ into (?, . . . , ?, al0 , ?, . . . , ?) ∈
Λ, where al0 is in the l1th entry. There are (m − 1)!
possible permutations that take (a0, a1, . . . , am−1) ∈ Λ
into (?, . . . , ?, al0 , ?, . . . , ?) ∈ Λ, where al0 is in the l1th
entry, and m!− (m−1)! that do not. Let us write a n-bit
string fv whose jth entry is 1 if v
j is a permutation of
the form (a0, a1, . . . , am−1)→ (?, . . . , ?, al0 , ?, . . . , ?) ∈ Λ,
where al0 is in the l1th entry, or 0 otherwise. Thus,
the number of elements v ∈ Λn for which fv has ω en-
tries equal to 1 and the rest n − ω entries equal to 0 is(
n
ω
)(
(m− 1)!)ω(m!− (m− 1)!)n−ω. Thus, from (35), we
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have
pn ≤ 1
(m!)n
n∑
ω=0
(
n
ω
)(
(m− 1)!)ω ×
×(m!− (m− 1)!)n−ω(√λ)ω
=
(
(m− 1)!)n
(m!)n
n∑
ω=0
(
n
ω
)
(m− 1)n−ω(√λ)ω
=
(
m− 1
m
)n n∑
ω=0
(
n
ω
)( √λ
m− 1
)ω
=
(
m− 1
m
)n(
1 +
√
λ
m− 1
)n
=
(
m− 1 +
√
λ
m
)n
, (36)
which is the claimed bound (19).
VII. A CLASS PCC OF UNCONDITIONALLY
SECURE ONE-OUT-OF-m SCOT PROTOCOLS
WITH LONG-DISTANCE CLASSICAL
COMMUNICATION
By implementing one-out-of-m DQACM as a subrou-
tine, the following class PCC of one-out-of-m SCOT
protocols only requires classical communication among
Bob’s distant agents. Alice and Bob agree on a refer-
ence frame F in spacetime, on m pairwise spacelike sep-
arated output spacetime regions R0, R1, . . . , Rm−1, and
on a spacetime point Qi of Ri, for i ∈ Im; they also agree
on Alice’s message xi in the causal past of Qi being from
the set Ωi = {0, 1}n, for some n ∈ N, and on a maxi-
mum allowed error rate γi = γ ≥ 0 on Bob’s outputs, for
i ∈ Im. We recall that G is the spacetime region consist-
ing in the intersection of the causal pasts of the spacetime
points Q0, Q1, . . . , Qm−1. We consider that from Bob’s
perspective, Alice’s inputs xi ∈ {0, 1}n are random, for
i ∈ {0, 1}n; and that from Alice’s perspective, Bob’s in-
put b ∈ Im = {0, 1, . . . ,m− 1} is random.
Alice has trusted agentsA,A0,A1, . . . ,Am−1, and Bob
has trusted agents B,B0,B1, . . . ,Bm−1. Each of Alice’s
(Bob’s) agents controls a secure laboratory. It is helpful
to consider that A and B have adjacent laboratories, and
that Ai and Bi have adjacent laboratories, for i ∈ Im. Al-
ice’s (Bob’s) agents share secure and authenticated classi-
cal channels. There is a classical channel and a quantum
channel between A and B, and there is a classical channel
between Ai and Bi, for i ∈ Im. It is possible that A and
Aj (B and Bj) are the same agent, for some j ∈ Im.
The class PCC of one-out-of-m SCOT protocols ex-
tends the one-out-of-two SCOT protocol of Ref. [2]. It
consists of two stages. Stage I includes quantum com-
munication between the agents A and B, which can take
place within their adjacent laboratories, and which can
take an arbitrarily long time, but which must be com-
pleted within G. For i ∈ Im, stage II includes fast classi-
cal processing and communication between the agents Ai
and Bi, which can take place within their adjacent labo-
ratories; it also includes classical communication between
the – possibly distant – pairs of agents A and Ai, and B
and Bi. The actions performed in the steps 1 to 6 take
place within G, unless otherwise stated. Fig. 4 illustrates
the class PCC of one-out-of-m SCOT protocols.
A. Stage I
1. Alice’s agent A and Bob’s agent B implement the
stage I of a one-out-of-m DQACM protocol with
random inputs s ∈ Λbasis and ri ∈ {0, 1}n by Alice,
and a random input c ∈ Im by Bob, for i ∈ Im.
This consists in A sending to B a quantum state
|Ψs
r
〉 encoding r = (r0, r1, . . . , rm−1) in a basis la-
beled by s, B applying a quantum measurement Mc
on the received quantum state, and B obtaining a
classical measurement outcome d. The stage I of
the DQACM protocol is completed in the spacetime
region G.
2. A sends copies of s, r0, r1, . . . , rm−1 to Ai, who re-
ceives them in the causal past of Qi, for i ∈ Im.
3. B transmits c and d to Bi, who receives these in
the causal past of Qi, for i ∈ Im.
B. Stage II
4. Within G, B generates his SCOT input b ∈ Im, and
transmits the number b′ = b + c modulo m to A,
who receives it within G.
5. For i ∈ Im, B transmits b to Bi, who receives it in
the causal past of Qi.
6. For i ∈ Im, A transmits b′ to Ai, who receives it in
the causal past of Qi.
7. For i ∈ Im, Ai generates xi in the causal past of
Qi, and gives ti = rb′−i ⊕ xi to Bi at Qi, where
b′ − i is modulo m.
8. For i ∈ Im, Ai gives s to Bi at Qi. This corresponds
to the first step in stage II of the DQACM protocol.
9. Within the spacetime region Rb, Bb uses s, d and c
to obtain the output rc (or r
′
c close to rc according
to a predetermined threshold) of the DQACM pro-
tocol. This corresponds to the second step in stage
II of the DQACM protocol.
10. Within Rb, Bb outputs xb = rc⊕tb (or x′b = r′c⊕tb,
which is close to xb according to a predetermined
threshold).
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FIG. 4. Illustration of the class PCC of one-out-of-m SCOT
protocols in a two-dimensional spacetime diagram in a frame
F of Minkowski spacetime. The world lines of the laboratories
of Alice’s agents A0,A1, . . . ,Am−1 (green rectangles), and of
the laboratories of Bob’s agents B0,B1, . . . ,Bm−1 (yellow rect-
angles) are indicated. The small dots represent the spacetime
points Q0, Q1, . . . , Qm−1. The thin diagonal lines represent
light rays. The spacetime region G, consisting in the intersec-
tion of the causal pasts of Q0, Q1, . . . , Qm−1, is represented by
the grey shaded area. The spacetime regions Ri, where Bob’s
agents must obtain Alice’s inputs xi, correspond to the small
red rectangles, for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m−1}. R0, R1, . . . , Rm−1 are
pairwise spacelike separated. Alice’s (Bob’s) inputs and out-
puts obtained within her (his) laboratories are represented by
vertical arrows. Communication from Alice to Bob, or vice
versa, is represented by diagonal arrows. Top: Stage I of the
one-out-of-m DQACM protocol is completed within G (black-
edged square); and stage II takes place around the spacetime
points Q0, Q1, . . . , Qm−1 (black-edged ellipses). In the illus-
trated example, we take Bob’s (Alice’s) agents B (A) and B1
(A1) to be the same agent, and we take b = 0. Lower left:
Stage I of the one-out-of-m DQACM protocol. Lower right:
Stage II of the one-out-of-m DQACM protocol, which can
be completed around any plurality of the spacetime points
Q0, Q1, . . . , Qm−1 that include the spacetime point Qb.
C. Comments and variations
We note that the class PCC of one-out-of-m SCOT
protocols shares various important properties with the
one-out-of-two SCOT protocol of Ref. [2]. First, B has
the freedom to choose b after he has measured the quan-
tum state received from A. Thus, the quantum commu-
nication and quantum measurement steps can take an
arbitrarily long time, but they must be completed within
G. Second, Alice has the freedom to choose her inputs
x0, x1, . . . ,xm−1 in real time, i.e. Ai can generate xi
anywhere in the causal past of Qi, for i ∈ Im. Third, dif-
ferent variations of the protocols can be considered. For
example, if B does not send b to Bi, Bi can act assuming
that b = i, for i ∈ Im. In particular, for i ∈ Im, inde-
pendently of whether B sends b to Bi, Bi can output a
message r′c that is equal to (or close to) Alice’s input rc
(see Fig. 4); although this does not allow Bi to obtain
xi (or a message x
′
i close to xi, unless i = b) as shown
below.
D. Correctness
We assume that the DQACM subroutine is
ǫcor−correct in the case that an error rate γ ≥ 0
on Bob’s output r′c is tolerated, for c ∈ Im. This means
that d(r′c, rc) ≤ γn with probability not smaller than
1 − ǫcor, for c ∈ Im. Therefore, d(x′b,xb) ≤ γn with
probability not smaller than 1 − ǫcor, for b ∈ Im. It
follows that the one-out-of-m SCOT protocols from the
class PCC are ǫcor−correct in the case that an error rate
γ ≥ 0 on Bob’s output x′b is tolerated, for b ∈ Im.
E. Security against dishonest Alice
Neither in the DQACM subroutine, nor in the whole
one-out-of-m SCOT protocol, Bob gives Alice any phys-
ical systems. Thus, Alice cannot obtain any information
about Bob’s SCOT input b ∈ Im. It follows that the
SCOT protocol is perfectly secure against dishonest Al-
ice.
F. Security against dishonest Bob
We assume that the DQACM subroutine is
ǫBob−secure against dishonest Bob. We show that
the one-out-of-m SCOT protocol from the class PCC is
ǫBob−secure against dishonest Bob. It follows that if the
DQACM subroutine is unconditionally secure against
dishonest Bob, i.e. if ǫBob goes to zero by increasing the
number of bits n of Alice’s input messages and possibly
some other security parameters, then the SCOT protocol
is unconditionally secure.
In order to show security against dishonest Bob, we as-
sume that Alice follows the one-out-of-m SCOT protocol
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honestly and Bob applies an arbitrary cheating strategy
allowed by quantum theory and relativity. Consider a
general cheating strategy by Bob in which he outputs a
message x′i ∈ {0, 1}n in Ri and a message x′j ∈ {0, 1}n in
Rj , which in a successful cheating strategy are equal to –
or very close to – Alice’s inputs xi and xj , respectively,
for some pair of different numbers i, j ∈ Im. Given that
Alice’s inputs r0, r1, . . . , rm−1 ∈ {0, 1}n are random, and
that Ai gives the message ti = rb′−i⊕xi to Bi at Qi, and
Aj gives the message tj = rb′−j ⊕ xj to Bj at Qj , the
goal of Bob’s cheating strategy is that Bi and Bj obtain
respective strings r′b′−i and r
′
b′−j , in Ri and Rj , that are
equal to – or close to – rb′−i and rb′−j with high prob-
ability, so that Bi outputs x′i = r′b′−i ⊕ ti in Ri and Bj
outputs x′j = r
′
b′−j ⊕ tj in Rj , which are equal to – or
close to – xi and xj , respectively, with high probability.
Therefore, Bob’s general strategy consists of three
main steps. In the first step, Bob’s agent B receives the
quantum state |Ψs
r
〉 in a quantum system A from Alice’s
agent A and applies a quantum operation O on A and
an extra ancillary system E consisting in a unitary op-
eration U on AE, independent of r and independent of
s, producing two quantum systems B0 and B1, including
also a measurement M˜
′
producing a classical outcome
(b′, i, j) ∈ Γ encoded in a system B′′, where we define
Γ = {(k, i, j) ∈ Im × Im × Im|i 6= j}. B then sends b′
to A (who sends b′ to Ak, for k ∈ Im) and he sends the
classical message (b′, i, j) encoded in a classical system
B′′0 and the quantum system B0 to Bob’s agent Bi, and
the classical message (b′, i, j) encoded in a classical sys-
tem B′′1 and the quantum system B1 to Bob’s agent Bj.
Thus, B sends B0B′′0 to Bi and B1B′′1 to Bj, while B′′ is
held by B, except for b′, which B sends to A.
In the second step, after reception of s from Ai, and
after reception of the classical message (b′, i, j) and of
the quantum system B0 from B, Bi applies a quantum
measurement M˜
s
0,b′,i,j – depending on both s and (b
′, i, j)
– on B0 and obtains the guess r
′
b′−i of rb′−i. Similarly,
after reception of s from Aj , and after reception of the
classical message (b′, i, j) and of the quantum system B1
from B, Bj applies a quantum measurement M˜s1,b′,i,j on
B1 and obtains the guess r
′
b′−j of rb′−j .
As shown in the Appendix B, the two steps above
are mathematically equivalent to the following situation.
More precisely, for any pair of different numbers i, j ∈ Im,
we show that the joint probability that Bob’s agent Bi
obtains a particular outcome r′b′−i as his guess of rb′−i
and Bob’s agent Bj obtains a particular outcome r′b′−j as
his guess of rb′−j in the procedure of the two steps above
is the same in the procedure described in the paragraph
below.
Bob’s agent B applies a quantum operation O′ on
the received quantum state |Ψsr〉A and an extra ancil-
lary system E′ = EB′′0B
′′
1B
′′, producing two quantum
systems B′0 = B0B
′′
0B
′′ and B′1 = B1B
′′
1 . The opera-
tion O′ consists in B applying the unitary operation U
on AE of the quantum operation O above, partitioning
AE into two subsystems B0 and B1, applying the quan-
tum measurement M˜
′
on B0B1 and preparing each of the
quantum systems B′′0 , B
′′
1 and B
′′ in a quantum state
|µb′,i,j〉, conditioned on the outcome of M˜′ being (b′, i, j),
for (b′, i, j) ∈ Γ, where {|µb′,i,j〉}(b′,i,j)∈Γ is an orthonor-
mal basis of each of the quantum systems B′′0 , B
′′
1 and
B′′. Conditioned on the outcome of M˜
′
being (b′, i, j), B
sends b′ to Alice’s agent A in part of the system B′′, and
B sends the joint system B0B′′0 (B1B′′1 ) to Bob’s agent
Bi (Bj). A quantum measurement M˜s0 is applied on the
joint system B′0 = B0B
′′
0B
′′, with Bi obtaining the out-
come r′b′−i from B0B
′′
0 , which is his guess of rb′−i. Bob’s
agent Bj applies a quantum measurement M˜s1 on the joint
system B′1 = B1B
′′
1 and obtains a classical outcome r
′
b′−j ,
which is his guess of rb′−j .
Finally, in the third step, after reception of the message
ti fromAi, Bi computes his guess x′i = r′b′−i⊕ti of xi and
outputs it in Ri. Similarly, after reception of tj from Aj ,
Bj computes his guess x′j = r′b′−j ⊕ tj of xj and outputs
it in Rj .
By assumption, the DQACM subroutine is
ǫBob−secure against dishonest Bob. By definition,
since we assume that Alice follows the protocol honestly,
for any pair of different numbers k and l from the set
Im, for any quantum operation O
′ independent of r and
independent of s applied by Bob on the quantum state
|Ψs
r
〉A that produces at least two quantum systems B′0
and B′1, and for any sets of quantum measurements{
M˜
s
0
}
s∈Λbasis and
{
M˜
s
1
}
s∈Λbasis , the probability to obtain
respective outcomes r′k and r
′
l satisfying d(r
′
k, rk) ≤ γn
and d(r′l, rl) ≤ γn, by respectively applying M˜
s
0 on
B′0 and M˜
s
1 on B
′
1, is not greater than ǫBob. Thus,
by considering k = b′ − i and l = b′ − j, we see from
the first and second steps of Bob’s general cheating
strategy in the one-out-of-m SCOT protocol, that the
probability that Bob’s agents Bi and Bj output r′b′−i
in Ri and r
′
b′−j in Rj satisfying d(r
′
b′−i, rb′−i) ≤ γn
and d(r′b′−j , rb′−j) ≤ γn, respectively, is not greater
than ǫBob. Since in the third step of Bob’s cheating
strategy Bi outputs x′i = r′b′−i ⊕ ti in Ri and Bj outputs
x
′
j = r
′
b′−j ⊕ tj in Rj , and since xi = rb′−i ⊕ ti and
xj = rb′−j⊕ tj, it follows that the probability that Bob’s
agents Bi and Bj output x′i in Ri and x′j in Rj satisfying
d(x′i,xi) ≤ γn and d(x′j ,xj) ≤ γn, respectively, is not
greater than ǫBob. This means, by definition, that the
one-out-of-m SCOT protocol is ǫBob−secure against
dishonest Bob, as claimed.
G. Examples
We consider that the DQACM subroutine belongs to
the class C introduced in section VI with l = 2, i.e. with
inputs by Alice ri ∈ {0, 1}n for i ∈ Im. We consider
separately the case where no errors in Bob’s output are
tolerated and the case where a small fraction of errors is
tolerated in Bob’s outputs.
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We consider first the ideal case of no errors. In this
case, the DQACM subroutine is perfectly correct, i.e
0−correct. It follows that a one-out-of-m SCOT pro-
tocol of the class PCC using this DQACM subroutine is
perfectly correct in the ideal case of no errors.
The class C of DQACM protocols with l = 2 is
ǫBob−secure against dishonest Bob, with ǫBob given by
(7), hence, unconditionally secure against dishonest Bob,
as ǫBob decreases exponentially with n. It follows that
a one-out-of-m SCOT protocol of the class PCC using
this DQACM subroutine is ǫBob−secure against dishon-
est Bob, with ǫBob given by (7), hence, unconditionally
secure against dishonest Bob. For example, consider that
the DQACM subroutine is given by the protocol of Exam-
ple 2 in section VIB. In this case, the DQACM protocol
is ǫm−secure against dishonest Bob, with ǫm given by
(18). Thus, from the arguments above, the one-out-of-m
SCOT protocol is ǫm−secure against dishonest Bob, with
ǫm given by (18). Since ǫm decreases exponentially with
n, the SCOT protocol is unconditionally secure against
dishonest Bob.
Now we consider the case where a small fraction of er-
rors is tolerated in Bob’s outputs. In the case that the
fraction of bit errors in Bob’s output in the DQACM
subroutine is below a threshold γ′′ ≥ 0, the DQACM
subroutine is perfectly correct by setting the allowed er-
ror rate γ′ equal or greater than γ′′. Thus, the SCOT
protocol of the class PCC using this DQACM subroutine
is perfectly correct in the case that a maximum allowed
error rate γ on Bob’s SCOT outputs is set to a value
equal or greater than γ′.
The class C of DQACM protocols with l = 2 is
ǫ
γ
Bob−secure against dishonest Bob, with ǫγBob given by
(8), hence, unconditionally secure against dishonest Bob,
as ǫγBob decreases exponentially with n, if γ ≤ Γ(λ)m , where
Γ
(λ)
m is the smallest solution of the equation (9). It follows
that a one-out-of-m SCOT protocol of the class PCC us-
ing this DQACM subroutine is ǫγBob−secure against dis-
honest Bob, with ǫγBob given by (8), hence, uncondition-
ally secure against dishonest Bob, if γ ≤ Γ(λ)m , where Γ(λ)m
is the smallest solution of the equation (9).
VIII. GENERALIZATIONS
We note that the one-out-of-m SCOT protocols of
the class PCC use one-out-of-m DQACM protocols as
a fundamental primtive. In the one-out-of-m DQACM
protocols, Alice’s agent A encodes m random messages
r0, r1, . . . , rm−1 from the agreed sets in a quantum state
that she gives to Bob’s agent B in a spacetime region
G, in such a way that the probability that Bob obtains
Alice’s input ri – or a message r
′
i very close to ri – in a
spacetime region R, and also Alice’s input rj – or a mes-
sage r′j very close to rj – in a spacetime region R
′ that
is spacelike separated from R, is very small, for any pair
of different numbers i, j from the set Im. We can then
use the one-out-of-mDQACM primitive to consider more
general SCOT schemes, as we illustrate below. We can
also extend the definition of DQACM, which allows us to
further generalize the definition of SCOT.
A. Using a one-out-of-m DQACM subroutine to
implement generalized versions of SCOT
Consider a more general setting for SCOT in a space-
time that is Minkowski or close to Minkowski. Alice and
Bob agree on a reference frame F in spacetime. Alice and
Bob agree on M ≥ 2 pairwise spacelike separated output
spacetime regions R0, R1, . . . , RM−1, and on a spacetime
point Qi of Ri, for i ∈ IM . Alice inputs messages xji ∈ Ωji
in the causal past of Qi, for j ∈ [Ni], where the set Ωji
and the number Ni ∈ N are previously agreed by Alice
and Bob, for i ∈ IM .
For some previously agreed integer m ≥ 2, Alice and
Bob perform a one-out-of-m DQACM subroutine. Alice
encodes random messages r0, r1, . . . , rm−1 from sets pre-
viously agreed with Bob in a quantum state |Ψsr〉, where s
denotes a basis randomly chosen by Alice from a set Λbasis
of non-mutually orthogonal bases previously agreed with
Bob, and where we denote r = (r0, r1, . . . , rm−1). Bob
receives the quantum state |Ψsr〉 from Alice in the space-
time region G, which is the intersection of the causal
pasts of Q0, Q1, . . . , QM−1. Bob inputs a number b ∈ Im
in G and obtains a message rb of his choice in any number
of the output spacetime regions. Alice applies a classical
encoding tji = E(xji , rlj
i
) of xji using rlj
i
, with the encod-
ing being previously agreed with Bob, for some lji ∈ Im,
for j ∈ [Ni] and i ∈ IM . For example, if xji , rlj
i
∈ {0, 1}nji
for some nji ∈ N, then we can set tji = xji ⊕ rlj
i
. Al-
ice then gives s to Bob in Qi, for i ∈ IM . Bob is then
able to complete the DQACM protocol and obtain the
message rb of his choice (or a message r
′
b close to rb) in
any number of the output spacetime regions. Alice also
gives the encoding message tji to Bob at Qi, for j ∈ [Ni]
and i ∈ IM . Bob is then able to decode Alice’s mes-
sage xji = D(tji , rlj
i
) (or a message xji
′
= D(tji , r′lj
i
) close
to xji ) in the output spacetime region Ri via a decod-
ing D using tji and rb (or r′b) if b = lji . For example, if
x
j
i , rlj
i
∈ {0, 1}nji for some nji ∈ N and tji = xji ⊕ rlj
i
then
Bob computes xji = t
j
i ⊕ rlj
i
(or xji
′
= tji ⊕ r′lj
i
).
The security guarantee of the one-out-of-m DQACM
subroutine is that Bob cannot obtain with non-negligible
probability Alice’s input ri – or a message r
′
i very close to
ri – in one output spacetime region and also Alice’s input
rj – or a message r
′
j very close to rj – in another output
spacetime region, for any pair of different numbers i, j
from the set Im. Thus, with unconditional security, it is
guaranteed in this generalized version of SCOT that Bob
cannot obtain a message xji – or a message x
j
i
′
very close
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to xji – in the output spacetime region Ri and a message
x
h
k – or a message x
h
k
′
very close to xhk – in the output
spacetime regionRk, for any pair of different numbers i, k
from the set IM for which it holds that l
j
i 6= lhk . Therefore,
in order to satisfy specific security constraints, Alice and
Bob must previously agree on the classical encodings tji =
E(xji , rlji ) and decodings D(t
j
i , rlji
), and particularly on
the messages r
l
j
i
of these encodings in order to satisfy
the desired security conditions.
B. k-out-of-m DQACM and SCOT
We can consider generalizations of one-out-of-m
DQACM to a k-out-of-m setting for arbitrary natural
numbers k < m and m ≥ 2. Broadly speaking, a k-
out-of-m DQACM protocol involves the following steps.
Alice prepares a quantum state |Ψs
r
〉 that she gives to
Bob, where r = (r0, r1, . . . , rm−1) and s are randomly
chosen by Alice from predetermined sets Ωoutcome and
Λbasis, respectively. Bob chooses k different numbers
c0, c1, . . . , ck−1 from the set Im and applies a quantum
measurement Mc labeled by c = (c0, c1, . . . , ck−1) on the
quantum state |Ψs
r
〉 and obtains a classical measurement
outcome d. Alice then gives s to Bob. Bob then uses
c, s and d to decode Alice’s inputs rc0 , rc1 , . . . , rck−1 . A
k-out-of-m DQACM protocol must satisfy a security con-
dition against dishonest Bob, according to which, for any
subset {li}ki=0 of k+1 different elements from the set Im,
for any quantum operation O independent of r and in-
dependent of s applied by Bob on the received quantum
state |Ψs
r
〉 that produces at least k + 1 quantum sys-
tems B0, B1, . . . , Bk, and for any quantum measurement
M˜
s
i applied on Bi depending on s, the probability that
the measurement outcome r′li is equal to rli - or very
close to rli according to a predetermined threshold – for
all i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k} is not greater than a small security
bound ǫ > 0, which ideally decreases by increasing the
size of Alice’s input messages and possibly by increasing
some other security parameters.
We can then use a k-out-of-m DQACM protocol as a
fundamental primitive to implement more general SCOT
protocols. For example, we may consider the follow-
ing definition of k-out-of-m SCOT, for natural numbers
k < m and m ≥ 2. We may consider that spacetime is
Minkowski or close to Minkowski. Alice and Bob agree
on a reference frame F in spacetime. Alice and Bob agree
on m ≥ 2 pairwise spacelike separated output spacetime
regions R0, R1, . . . , Rm−1, and on a spacetime point Qi
of Ri, for i ∈ Im. Alice inputs a message xi ∈ Ωi in the
causal past of Qi, where the set Ωi is previously agreed
by Alice and Bob, for i ∈ Im. Bob inputs k different
numbers b0, b1, . . . , bk−1 from the set Im. In a correct k-
out-of-m SCOT protocol Bob outputs xbi – or a message
very close to it according to a predetermined threshold–
in Rbi , for i ∈ Ik. We may define security against dishon-
est Alice as the guarantee that Alice cannot obtain any
information about Bob’s input b = (b0, b1, . . . , bk−1) any-
where in spacetime, when Bob follows the honest proto-
col and Alice implements an arbitrary cheating strategy
allowed by quantum theory and relativity. We define a
k-out-of-m SCOT protocol to be secure against dishon-
est Bob if, when Alice follows the protocol honestly and
Bob implements an arbitrary cheating strategy allowed
by quantum theory and relativity, the probability that
Bob outputs xi – or a message very close to xi accord-
ing to a predetermined threshold – in Ri, for any k + 1
different numbers i from the set Im, is not greater than
a small security bound ǫ > 0, which ideally decreases by
increasing the size of Alice’s input messages and possibly
by increasing some other security parameters.
We outline a way to construct k-out-of-m DQACM
protocols by extending the one-out-of-m DQACM proto-
cols of the class C given in section VI. In the one-out-of-m
DQACM protocols of the class C, for j ∈ [n], the quan-
tum system Aj = Aj0A
j
1 · · ·Ajm−1 encodes the jth entries
r
j
i ∈ Ω of the messages ri, in a quantum state |ψs
j
rj
〉Aj =⊗
i∈Im |αirj
i
〉
A
j
s
j
i
, where rj = (rj0, r
j
1, . . . , r
j
m−1), where the
orthogonal bases Di = {|αir〉}r∈Ω are not mutually or-
thogonal, for i ∈ Im, and where sj = (sj0, sj1, . . . , sjm−1)
indicates which subsystem of Aj encodes the number rji
in the basis Di, for i ∈ Im.
We suggest to extend the class C to k-out-of-m
DQACM protocols as follows. For j ∈ [n], Alice
and Bob perform the following actions. In the stage
I, Alice randomly chooses sj ∈ Λ and rji ∈ Ω, for
i ∈ Im. Alice prepares k copies of the quantum
state |ψsj
rj
〉Aj . More precisely, Alice prepares a quan-
tum system A˜j = Aj,0Aj,1 · · ·Aj,k−1, with Aj,l =
A
j,l
0 A
j,l
1 · · ·Aj,lm−1 for l ∈ Ik, in the quantum state
|ψ˜sj
rj
〉A˜j =
⊗
l∈Ik |ψs
j
rj
〉Aj,l that she gives to Bob. Bob
measures each subsystem Aj,l0 , A
j,l
1 , . . . , A
j,l
m−1 of A
j,l in
the basis Dcl and obtains classical measurement out-
comes dj,l = (dj,l0 , d
j,l
1 , . . . , d
j,l
m−1), for l ∈ Ik, where
c0, c1, . . . , ck−1 are different numbers input by Bob from
the set Im indicating that Bob wishes to learn Alice’s in-
puts rc0 , rc1 , . . . , rck−1 . In the stage II, Alice gives s
j to
Bob. Bob then uses c0, c1, . . . , ck−1, sj and his outcome
dj,l to obtain rjcl , for l ∈ Ik. Thus, we see that Bob ob-
tains rc0 , rc1 , . . . , rck−1 , as required. We leave as an open
problem to investigate whether the k-out-of-m DQACM
protocols of this class are unconditionally secure against
dishonest Bob.
C. Further generalizations of SCOT
More generally, we can consider SCOT settings in
which Alice inputs some messages in specific regions of
spacetime, Bob generates inputs in some regions of space-
time, and Bob obtains some outputs correlated to some
of Alice’s inputs in some specific regions of spacetime.
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Alice and Bob previously agree on spacetime constraints
indicating regions of spacetime where Alice should be un-
able, or able, to obtain specific information about Bob’s
inputs; and indicating also regions of spacetime where
Bob should be able or unable to obtain specific informa-
tion about Alice’s inputs. The SCOT settings and pro-
tocols that we have discussed in this paper are particular
examples within this general setting.
One could consider generalizations with more than two
parties. Additionally, although we have focused here in
output spacetime regions that are pairwise spacelike sep-
arated, one could also consider that some output space-
time regions are timelike separated. We expect that in
the latter case the security guarantees would be softened.
IX. DISCUSSION
In addition to the LODT protocol of Ref. [20] and
the one-out-of-two SCOT protocols of Refs. [1, 2],
the one-out-of-m SCOT protocols and generalizations
presented here are further examples of uncondition-
ally secure spacetime-constrained secure computations.
Spacetime-constrained secure computation is a research
problem initially outlined by Kent [20], in which, in ad-
dition to the requirements of standard secure computa-
tions [4], the inputs and outputs of the computation are
restricted to be within constrained regions of spacetime.
By definition, in these tasks the inputs and outputs con-
sist in classical information.
It would be interesting to investigate connections be-
tween SCOT and other quantum relativistic crypto-
graphic tasks that have some intrinsically quantum in-
puts, for example, summoning [31], in its various ver-
sions [31–35], where a given quantum state must be re-
turned at specific regions of spacetime. In particular, in
the localize-exclude task introduced in Ref. [35], a quan-
tum state must be localized to a collection of authorized
spacetime regions while guaranteeing that the state can-
not be localized to unauthorized spacetime regions. It
would be interesting to investigate connections between
SCOT and the localize-exclude task, or other versions of
summoning. For example, can SCOT be used as a sub-
routine to implement a summoning task, or vice versa?
The defined task of one-out-of-m DQACM allowed us
to construct an unconditionally secure class PCC of one-
out-of-m SCOT protocols that do not require to trans-
mit quantum states between distant locations. We pro-
vided examples of unconditionally secure one-out-of-m
DQACM protocols, hence of unconditionally secure one-
out-of-m SCOT protocols. We believe that one-out-of-
m DQACM and one-out-of-m SCOT, and generaliza-
tions (e.g. in the k-out-of-m setting), may be useful
primitives to build other cryptographic tasks with no-
communication constraints, due to spacelike separation
or otherwise. For example, our proposed (or other) un-
conditionally secure protocols for one-out-of-m DQACM
can be used to implement the task of bit string coordina-
tion, which is a primitive to perform some supermoney
schemes: virtual tokens that are capable to guarantee un-
conditional security based on the laws of quantum physics
and relativity [36].
The tasks of one-out-of-m and k-out-of-m distributed
quantum access with classical memory (DQACM) in-
troduced here seem related to quantum random access
codes, with security conditions similar to those of one-
out-of-m and k-out-of-m oblivious transfer, hence the
name we chose to denote these tasks. Broadly speak-
ing, in a quantum random access code (QRAC) [37, 38],
Alice encodes various classical messages in a quantum
state, and Bob decides which message to access. For
example, a (n,m, p) quantum random access code is a
scheme in which Alice encodes n bits into m qubits in
such a way that Bob can recover any bit of his choice
with a probability p > 12 , where in general one consid-
ers n > m. The first motivation to study QRACs was
given by Wiesner [37], who introduced the concept of
QRACs with the name of ‘conjugate coding’, in quan-
tum cryptography: quantum money that is impossible
to counterfeit. In the literature of QRACs, the questions
that are mainly investigated relate to the efficiency of the
encodings. For example, one investigates for which val-
ues of m and n with n > m there exist (n,m, p) QRACs
with p > 12 [38–40], the maximum achievable values of
p given m and n, how extra resources like randomness
[41] and entanglement [42] improve the efficiency of the
encodings, etc. Extensions in which Alice encodes n dits
in m qudits, where Bob can retrieve any dit of his choice
with probability p > 1
d
, for d ≥ 2, are considered in
Ref. [43]. Extensions of QRACs codes in which Alice en-
codes, and Bob decodes, intrinsically quantum informa-
tion were introduced in Ref. [44]. In Ref. [45], a variation
of QRACs denoted as parity oblivious multiplexing was
investigated within a framework of operational theories
containing quantum theory as a particular case, and an
experimental demonstration of QRACs was performed.
It would be interesting to investigate these questions for
DQACM, and to investigate further connections between
QRACs and DQACM. In particular, can we use results,
or intuitions, gained from QRACs to construct uncondi-
tionally secure DQACM protocols?
Our proposed protocols for one-out-of-m DQACM and
SCOT tolerate small error rates, but they do not consider
losses. Although dealing with losses is standard in quan-
tum cryptography, it would be interesting to investigate
explicit protocols, as in the lines suggested in Ref. [2]
for the one-out-of-two case, for instance. Obtaining un-
conditionally secure protocols with higher allowed error
rated would be helpful too. Furthermore, it would be
interesting to prove, or disprove, that our proposed k-
out-of-m DQACM protocols are unconditionally secure.
More generally, it would be interesting to find further
unconditionally secure SCOT protocols, for example, for
the generalized versions of SCOT suggested in section
VIII.
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Appendix A: Proof of the bound (34)
We show the bound (34) for the case l0 = 0 and l1 = 1.
The proof follows straightforwardly for the general case
l0, l1 ∈ Im with l0 6= l1.
For fixed s and v, we define the sets τ =
{
j ∈
[n]
∣∣sj
vj ,1 = s
j
0
}
and τc =
{
j ∈ [n]∣∣sj
vj ,1 6= sj0
}
. We
define ωv = |τ |, that is, ωv is the number of en-
tries vj of v corresponding to a permutation that takes
(a0, a1, . . . , am−1) ∈ Λ to (?, a0, ?, ?, . . . , ?) ∈ Λ where
‘?’ denotes any allowed entry after the permutation. As
explicitly stated by the notation, we see that ωv only de-
pends on v, but not on s. Using the definitions (2) and
(32), we express Fs and Gsv by
Fs =
∑
r
[⊗
j∈τ
i∈Im
(∣∣αi
r
j
i
〉〈
αi
r
j
i
∣∣)
C
j
s
j
i
⊗
j∈τc
i∈Im
(∣∣αi
r
j
i
〉〈
αi
r
j
i
∣∣)
C
j
s
j
i
×
×
⊗(
Πr00s
)
B0
⊗
1B1
]
,
Gsv =
∑
r
[⊗
j∈τ
i∈Im
(∣∣αi
r
j
i
〉〈
αi
r
j
i
∣∣)
C
j
s
j
vj,i
×
×
⊗
j∈τc
i∈Im
(∣∣αi
r
j
i
〉〈
αi
r
j
i
∣∣)
C
j
s
j
vj,i
×
×
⊗
1B0
⊗
(Πr11sv )B1
]
. (A1)
Below we compute FsGsvFs. We express the left
hand operator Fs in terms of the dummy variables r =
(r0, r1, . . . , rm−1) ∈ Ωnm and the right hand one in terms
of z = (z0, z1, . . . , zm−1) ∈ Ωnm. The operator Gsv is
expressed in terms of w = (w0,w1, . . . ,wm−1) ∈ Ωnm.
For this computation we use the following properties: 1)
from the definitions of τ and τc, we have that s
j
vj ,1 = s
j
0
for j ∈ τ , and sj
vj ,1 6= sj0 for j ∈ τc; 2) summing over
z0 we obtain z0 → r0 because Πr00sΠz00s = δr0,z0Πr00s,
since
{
Πr00s
}
r0∈Ωn is a projective measurement; and 3)∑
a∈Ω|αia〉〈αia| = 1 (the identity on a l-dimensional
Hilbert space) because Di = {|αia〉}a∈Ω is an orthonor-
mal basis of a l-dimensional Hilbert space, for i ∈ Im.
Thus, after summing over ri,wi′ , zi′′ , for i, i
′, i′′ ∈ Im
with i 6= 0 and i′ 6= 1, we obtain
FsGsvFs =
∑
r0,w1
[⊗
j∈τ
(∣∣∣〈α0
r
j
0
∣∣∣α1
w
j
1
〉∣∣∣2 ×
×
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j
0
〉〈
α0
r
j
0
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C
j
s
j
0
⊗
i∈[m−1]
1
C
j
s
j
i
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×
×
⊗
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r
j
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j
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C
j
s
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×
×
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1
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j
1
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C
j
s
j
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×
×
⊗
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vj
1
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j
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j
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)⊗(
Πr00s
)
B0
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×
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Πw11sv
)
B1
]
, (A2)
where Ivj =
{
i ∈ [m− 1]
∣∣sji 6= sjvj ,1}.
Using
∣∣∣〈α0
r
j
0
∣∣∣α1
w
j
1
〉∣∣∣2 ≤ λ from (4) and |τ | = ωv, we
obtain
FsGsvFs ≤ (λ)ωv
∑
r0,w1
[⊗
j∈τ
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j
0
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α0
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j
0
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j
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1
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j
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j∈τc
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i∈I
vj
1C
s
j
i
)⊗(
Πr00s
)
B0
×
×
⊗(
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]
. (A3)
Using that
{
Πr00s
}
r0∈Ωn and
{
Πw11sv
}
w1∈Ωn are projec-
tive measurements, it is straightforward to see that the
right-hand term of (A3) times (λ)−ωv is a projector.
Thus, ‖(λ)−ωvFsGsvFs‖ ≤ 1, which implies (34).
We have shown (34) for the particular case l0 = 0 and
l1 = 1. But, since from (4) we have
∣∣〈αl0r ∣∣αl1w〉∣∣∣2 ≤ λ
for any pair of different numbers l0, l1 ∈ Im, and for any
r, ω ∈ Ω, it is straightforward to see from the derivation
above that the bound (34) holds for any pair of different
numbers l0, l1 ∈ Im.
Appendix B: Details about the quantum
measurements of Bob’s agents
Here we show that the following two procedures (1)
and (2) described below are mathematically equivalent.
More precisely, for any pair of different numbers i, j ∈ Im,
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we show that the joint probability that Bob’s agent Bi
obtains a particular outcome ei as his guess of rb′−i and
Bob’s agent Bj obtains a particular outcome ej as his
guess of rb′−j in procedure (1) is the same in procedure
(2), for any ei, ej ∈ Ω˜, where it is assumed that Ωk = Ω˜
is the set of possible values of rk, for k ∈ Im.
In the procedure (1), Bob’s agent B receives the quan-
tum state |Ψsr〉A in a quantum system A from Alice’s
agent A, he introduces an ancillary system E and applies
a unitary operation U on AE, then he applies a quantum
measurement M˜
′
on AE obtaining a classical outcome
(b′, i, j) ∈ Γ, with (b′, i, j) being recorded in systems B′′0 ,
B′′1 and B
′′, where Γ = {(k, i, j) ∈ Im × Im × Im|i 6= j}.
B partitions the joint system AE into B0 and B1. B in-
spects (b′, i, j) from his system B′′ and then he sends b′ to
Alice’s agentA, and B0 (B1) and B′′0 (B′′1 ) to Bob’s agent
Bi (Bj). Bob’s agent Bi (Bj) obtains the value (b′, i, j)
from the system B′′0 (B
′′
1 ) and then applies a projective
measurement M˜
s
0,b′,i,j (M˜
s
1,b′,i,j) on B0 (B1) and obtains
a classical outcome ei (ej) which is his guess of rb′−i
(rb′−j).
In the procedure (2), B applies the following quantum
operation O′ on AE′, where E′ = EB′′0B
′′
1B
′′: B pre-
pares the quantum system B′′0B
′′
1B
′′ in a quantum state
|µ0,0,1〉B′′0 ⊗|µ0,0,1〉B′′1 ⊗|µ0,0,1〉B′′ , he applies a unitary op-
eration U on AE, and then he applies a unitary operation
U ′ on the total system B0B1B′′0B
′′
1B
′′, where the joint
system AE is partitioned into the subsystems B0 and
B1 (as in the procedure (1)). The unitary operation U
′
consists in B applying the quantum measurement M˜′ on
B0B1 and preparing each of the quantum systemsB
′′
0 , B
′′
1
and B′′ in a quantum state |µb′,i,j〉, conditioned on the
outcome of M˜
′
being (b′, i, j), where {|µb′,i,j〉}(b′,i,j)∈Γ is
an orthonormal basis of each of the quantum systems B′′0 ,
B′′1 and B
′′, for (b′, i, j) ∈ Γ. Conditioned on the outcome
of M˜
′
being (b′, i, j), B sends b′ to Alice’s agent A in part
of the system B′′, and B sends the joint system B0B′′0
(B1B
′′
1 ) to Bob’s agent Bi (Bj). A quantum measure-
ment M˜
s
0 is applied on the joint system B
′
0 = B0B
′′
0B
′′,
with Bi obtaining the outcome ei from B0B′′0 , which is
his guess of rb′−i. Bob’s agent Bj applies a quantum mea-
surement M˜
s
1 on the joint system B
′
1 = B1B
′′
1 and obtains
a classical outcome ej , which is his guess of rb′−j .
We give details of the procedures (1) and (2) described
above. The quantum state |Ψs
r
〉A is transmitted to Bob’s
agent B. Bob’s agent B introduces an ancillary system
E′, which includes a system E of arbitrary finite Hilbert
space dimension and extra ancillary systems B′′0 , B
′′
1 and
B′′, each one of Hilbert space dimension m2(m−1). The
system E is set initially to an arbitrary quantum state
|χ〉, and the systems B′′0 , B′′1 and B′′ are set initially
to the state |µ0,0,1〉, where {|µk,i,j〉|(k, i, j) ∈ Γ} is an
orthonormal basis of B′′0 , B
′′
1 and B
′′, and where Γ =
{(k, i, j) ∈ Im × Im × Im|i 6= j}. Bob’s agent B applies
an arbitrary unitary operation U on the joint quantum
system AE. The global state is transformed into the
state |Φsr〉B0B1 |µ0,0,1〉B′′0 |µ0,0,1〉B′′1 |µ0,0,1〉B′′ , where
|Φs
r
〉B0B1 = UAE |Ψsr〉A|χ〉E , (B1)
and where the joint quantum system AE is partitioned
into two subsystems B0 and B1.
Consider the unitary operation U ′ applied on the whole
system AE′ = B0B1B′′0B
′′
1B
′′:
U ′ =
∑
(b′,i,j)∈Γ
[
(Rb′,i,j)B0B1 ⊗ (Wb′,i,j)B′′0 ×
×⊗ (Wb′,i,j)B′′1 ⊗ (Wb′,i,j)B′′
]
, (B2)
where Wb′,i,j is a unitary operation acting on a
Hilbert space of dimension m2(m − 1) satisfying
Wb′,i,j |µ0,0,1〉 = |µb′,i,j〉, for (b′, i, j) ∈ Γ; and where
M˜
′
= {Rb′,i,j}(b′,i,j)∈Γ is a projective measurement on
B0B1. Consider the projective measurement M˜
s
a,b′,i,j =
{Πea,s,b′,i,j}e∈Ω˜ on Ba, for a ∈ {0, 1}, (b′, i, j) ∈ Γ and
s ∈ Λbasis, where Λbasis is the set of possible values of s.
Consider the projectors
Πe0,s =
∑
(b′,i,j)∈Γ
[(
Πe0,s,b′,i,j
)
B0
⊗ (|µb′,i,j〉〈µb′,i,j |)B′′0 ×
×⊗ 1B′′
]
(B3)
acting on B′0 = B0B
′′
0B
′′, and the projectors
Πe1,s =
∑
(b′,i,j)∈Γ
(
Πe1,s,b′,i,j
)
B1
⊗ (|µb′,i,j〉〈µb′,i,j |)B′′1 (B4)
acting on B′1 = B1B
′′
1 , for e ∈ Ω˜ and s ∈ Λbasis. It
is straightforward to see that M˜
s
a = {Πeas}e∈Ω˜ is a pro-
jective measurement acting on B′a, for a ∈ {0, 1} and
s ∈ Λbasis.
It is straightforward to see that, for any pair of different
numbers i, j ∈ Im, the joint probability that Bi obtains a
particular outcome ei as his guess of rb′−i and Bj obtains
a particular outcome ej as his guess of rb′−j in procedure
(1) is the same in procedure (2), for any ei, ej ∈ Ω˜, as
claimed.
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